

## **Demystifying Human Smuggling Operations Along the Arizona-Mexican Border**

**By**

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The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview and analysis of the problem of human smuggling along the U.S.-Mexican border. Using open source material, economic analysis, and experts' opinions, the paper details the scope, methods, and associated negative externalities of human smuggling. In writing this report, careful attention was made to separate between incidents of trafficking and human smuggling. However, since many times media articles, especially in Spanish, use the term trafficking instead of smuggling, some of the citations and original sources will include the terms human trafficking. As such, to the greatest extent, information applicable only to human trafficking has been eliminated.

This paper is split into two parts. The first part begins by defining human smuggling and its component crimes. To this end, it lays out the international, federal, and state legal definitions of human smuggling as well as the federal jurisdictions for human smuggling's component crimes. After defining the problem, this paper discusses the logic behind the decision to migrate. It reflects the prevailing wisdom among migration experts as well as an alternative explanation of the decision making process. Next, the paper lays out the various estimates of the UDA population and extrapolates the potential flow of undocumented aliens (UDA) across U.S. borders. The paper then describes the UDA population in terms of nationality and socio-economic characteristics. Finally, the paper presents the necessary elements for smuggling operations. The second part is a primer on current smuggling operations in different states in Mexico. Using open source literature from Mexican and U.S. newspapers, it outlines human smuggling methods, the roads and transportation they use, and the path UDAs use to reach the United States. In general, the purpose is to show how the fundamental elements of human smuggling are expressed in reality.

<b>PART I.....</b>	<b>3</b>
Introduction.....	3
Human Smuggling versus Human Trafficking.....	4
The Logic of Migration.....	7
The Scope of the Problem.....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
<i>Low Estimates of the Undocumented Population</i> .....	11
<i>High Estimates of the Undocumented Population</i> .....	11
<i>Annual Flow</i> .....	12
Nationality and Socio-Economic Composition of UDAs.....	14
Destinations for UDAs.....	15
Finding Employment.....	16
Smuggling Methods.....	17
The Rise of Smuggling Operations Along the U.S.-Mexico Border.....	18
The Business Model of Human Smuggling.....	222
<i>Trade and Development Model</i> .....	22
<i>The Supermarket Model</i> .....	23
Necessary Elements for a Successful Smuggling Operation.....	23
<i>Transportation</i> .....	24
<i>Public Corruption</i> .....	24
<i>Stash Houses</i> .....	24
<i>Repatriation</i> .....	25
Overview of Smuggling Operations.....	27
 <b>PART II.....</b>	 <b>28</b>
Hidalgo, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and Michoacan.....	28
Sonora.....	28
<i>The Smuggling Triangle</i> .....	30
<i>Caborca to Sonoyta</i> .....	32
<i>San Luis-Sonoyta</i> .....	32
<i>Pricing and Common Smuggling Methods</i> .....	33
Baja California Norte.....	35
<i>Smuggling Routes and Methods</i> .....	36
Chiapas.....	37
<i>Railroad Route</i> .....	37
<i>Other Smuggling Routes and Methods</i> .....	40
<i>Smuggling Fees</i> .....	41
Veracruz.....	42
<i>Smuggling Groups</i> .....	42
<i>Smuggling Routes</i> .....	42
<i>Human Smuggling Methods</i> .....	44
Tabasco.....	44
<i>Smuggling Groups &amp; Routes</i> .....	44
Campeche.....	45
<i>Smuggling Routes</i> .....	45
<i>Smuggling Methods</i> .....	45
Sinaloa.....	46
<i>Smuggling Routes</i> .....	47
<i>Smuggling Methods/Smuggling Fees</i> .....	47

## Part I

### Introduction

The United States has long been a destination for legal and illegal immigrants seeking better economic opportunities and asylum from political repression and violence. Traditionally, the Southwest border of the United States has been the conduit for many illegal immigrants entering from Mexico and Central and South America. For many years, illegal immigrants or undocumented aliens (UDAs) crossed the U.S.-Mexican border with relative impunity for seasonal work opportunities in low-skilled sectors. Relatives or individuals with knowledge about crossing the border assisted UDAs to cross into the United States through such areas as El Paso and San Diego. In the 1990s, public pressure to prevent illegal immigration and drug trafficking reached a crescendo and pushed Congress and the Federal government to step up its efforts at monitoring the border and apprehending UDAs.

To this aim, the U.S. Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Commissioner announced a five-part strategy in 1994 to strengthen enforcement of the nation's immigration laws by raising the economic cost of crossing into the United States. The first part of the strategy was to create "prevention through deterrence" by raising the risk of apprehension as to "make it so difficult and so costly to enter this country illegally that fewer individuals even try."<sup>1</sup> INS, a Department of Homeland Security legacy agency, closed off routes frequently used by smugglers and illegal aliens (generally through urban areas) to shift these flows to more remote and difficult areas to cross. The program succeeded in raising the cost of entering the United States illegally, but also had the unintended consequence of increasing the criminalization of UDA entry into the United States. Given the difficulty of crossing through San Diego and El Paso, UDAs have come to increasingly employ human smugglers. By 1999, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that 70% of illegal aliens from Mexico use "coyotes" (as they are known in the United States) or "polleros" (as they are known in Mexico).<sup>2</sup> As a result, UDAs have become increasingly subjected to dangerous situations resulting in death, injury, and exploitation. This "terrible paradox"<sup>3</sup>—enforcement of immigration laws leads to increased human smuggling and human trafficking—has also increased the prevalence of other crimes such as automobile theft, criminal damage, trespassing, drug trafficking, and money laundering.

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<sup>1</sup> "Building a Comprehensive Southwest Border Enforcement Strategy," *Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)*. Washington, D.C. June 1996, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> According to a 1999 International Organization for Migration study as cited in: James O. Finckenauer and Jennifer Schrock. "Human Trafficking: A Growing Criminal Market in the U.S." International Center National Institute of Justice

<sup>3</sup> Raimo Väyrynen, "Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking, and Organized Crime." Discussion Paper No. 2003/72 United Nations University October 2003

### **Human Smuggling versus Human Trafficking**

Before discussing human smuggling, it is necessary to point out the differences between smuggling and trafficking in human beings. While many publications and media articles use the term interchangeably—sometimes creating confusion—policy makers and law enforcement agencies view these two crimes separately. Both crimes involve transporting human beings for remuneration whether for money or in exchange for some completed task. In the case of human smuggling, the smuggled person willingly enters into a contract to be smuggled into a new country. After being smuggled, this individual will pay the human smuggler some type of remuneration and the contract is complete. On the other hand, human traffickers often use deception to convince a person to be trafficked within a country or into another country. Once trafficked, the trafficker physically or psychologically forces the trafficked person to work off debts. Many times, these debts are never paid off leaving the undocumented person trapped at an extremely low paying job or in a dangerous occupation such as prostitution.

It is this latter aspect of trafficking which has brought most of the world's attention and been the subject of numerous academic and government studies. In general, nations have found the crime reprehensible and have worked to combat it, equating it to modern day slavery. Parties to the United Nations eventually agreed to introduce the Palermo Convention which defined human trafficking as:

“...the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;”<sup>4</sup>

One particular issue during the negotiations at Palermo was the issue of victim consent. Some nations did not believe for legal reasons that traffickers receiving initial consent from victims could be held liable for the entire course of the crime. Eventually, most nations came around to agreeing that even initial consent could not be interpreted as consent to the latter crimes if the victim had been coerced or otherwise deceived. Even with this definition, however, there are instances where the United States government prosecutes a crime as trafficking that otherwise lies outside of the scope of the international definition. To date, 117 countries have signed the Convention and 95 countries have ratified.

Palermo also made strides in developing a protocol on human smuggling. However, the difficulties of source and destination countries to settle differences on the issue of international irregular migration and concerns over potentially denying asylum seekers through stronger border enforcement hindered efforts toward an overall encompassing

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<sup>4</sup> “United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. Article 3(a).

agreement. This second protocol eventually became a protocol on victim's rights but took the first step of defining the human smuggling problem.

The United States has worked aggressively to combat human trafficking and to a lesser extent to deter human smuggling. Human trafficking at the Federal level is prosecuted through the Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section of the United States Department of Justice. Specifically, human trafficking can be prosecuted under statutes used to protect 13<sup>th</sup> Amendment rights, namely Title 18 U.S.C., Sections 1581 and 1584. Interpretation of Section 1584 has led to an understanding that a person cannot be compelled or forced to work against their will either through use of force, threat of force, threat of legal coercion or by "a climate of fear" tantamount to the individual fearing harm if the person leaves or refuses to work. Likewise, Section 1581 addresses the debt servitude aspect common to human trafficking operations. Supplementing these statutes are statutes promulgated under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. These statutes introduced greater statutory maximum sentences, resources for the protection and assistance of victims—temporary stay visas and immunity for cooperation in prosecution. The Act also encourages international cooperation with nations working to prevent human trafficking and requires annual country reports from the State Department.

The attention paid to combat human trafficking is noticeably absent with human smuggling. There is no specific legislation aimed at combating human smuggling analogous to the Victims of Trafficking Act. Instead, federal prosecutors use section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which prohibits knowingly or recklessly transporting or harboring undocumented aliens, and has a maximum punishment of 10 years of imprisonment per a smuggled UDA. Prosecutors can enhance these charges if the crime also includes serious bodily injury or places a UDA's life in jeopardy. Additionally, human smugglers can face prosecution under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 18 USC §1961(1) and the money laundering statute, 18 USC § 1956.

In essence, the U.S. legal approach toward human smuggling separates it into three crimes—immigration violation, racketeering, and money laundering. This separation leads to several overlapping jurisdictions among federal agencies based on their functional specializations. Beginning with immigration laws, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs within the Department of State will investigate visa and passport fraud and provide training to foreign officials overseas. These duties dovetail with those of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection, and the Coast Guard, which are charged with enforcing U.S. immigration laws. On the racketeering side, the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Criminal Division at the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation assist the U.S. Attorney General and United States Attorneys in prosecuting human smugglers. Finally, the Criminal Investigation unit at the Internal Revenue Service and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) at the Treasury Department support these other agencies in the prosecution of human smugglers.

Table 1

<b>Jurisdiction of Federal Agencies</b>	
<b>Department of State</b>	
Bureau of Diplomatic Security	Protects integrity of U.S. passports and visas;
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs	Assists in developing policies and programs (e.g., technical assistance and training) to combat alien smuggling et al; Provides law enforcement training on combating alien smuggling to foreign officials; Works with international partners to interdict and halt alien smuggling; Provide support to parties of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocol on migrant smuggling;
<b>Department of Treasury</b>	
IRS: Criminal Investigation	May conduct alien-smuggling investigations with ICE;
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)	Helps to combat money laundering and other financial crimes; Serves as central source for financial intelligence information and analysis; Supports the investigative and prosecutive efforts of numerous law enforcement agencies; Administers the largest financial transaction reporting system in the world;
<b>Department of Homeland Security</b>	
ICE: Office of Investigations; ICE: Office of Intelligence	Identifies, locates, disrupts, and prosecutes criminal enterprises that (1) bring, transport, harbor, and smuggle people into the United States illegally or (2) engage in human trafficking
Customs and Border Protection	Patrols the border and deters, detects, and prevents terrorists and terrorist weapons, illegal aliens, and the smuggling of contraband into the United States;
Coast Guard	Enforces U.S. immigration law at sea
<b>Department of Justice</b>	
U.S. Attorneys Offices	Is the chief federal law enforcement officer within his or her particular jurisdiction and prosecutes federal criminal cases;
Criminal Division: Domestic Security Section	Collaborates with U.S. Attorney's Offices in investigating and prosecuting alien smugglers; Provides immediate legal advice to ICE and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security; Provides assistance on international and intelligence matters and legal and policy guidance on immigration crimes and violent crimes to U.S. Attorney's Offices; Participates on the committee to review ICE proposed undercover investigations relating to alien smuggling or immigration fraud;
Criminal Division: Organized Crime and Racketeering Section	Combats alien smuggling as it relates to being a sophisticated organized criminal activity; Assists U.S. Attorney's Offices to prosecute alien-smuggling cases involving organized crime groups;
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Plays a role in specific investigations involving terrorism and when alien smuggling becomes the predicate crime as stated under RICO; As per a May 2003 memorandum, becomes the lead investigator in cases involving terrorism including terrorists' travel-facilitating networks e.g. alien smuggling, fraudulent document vendors, corrupt foreign government officials, and suspect travel agencies; Participates in several international forums related to human smuggling;

## The Logic of Migration

Migration experts point to several factors leading to an individual's decision to migrate. These experts generally divide these factors into two broad categories of "push" and "pull." Push factors are those which seem "push" individuals to migrate to a new country. These include poor economic opportunities, abject poverty, and political instability. Pull factors include familial and community ties in the destination country. While push factors may be the impetus for migration, pull factors influence the choice of destination. Some experts believe that geographical location plays an important determinant in the final location of a migrant. However, others believe that familial and community ties become increasingly more important as migration routes from one country to another mature. They note that the presence of relatives or a large similar ethnic community lures new migrants and enables them to avoid transaction costs associated with securing employment and housing.

In the case of migration from Mexico and Central American countries, both push and pull factors are present. Excluding Costa Rica, most Central American countries and Mexico have significant levels unemployment and poverty. In addition, the population growth in many of the Central American countries is slated to double within the next 50 years. These factors limit economic opportunities and have made the economies in Central America less attractive in comparison to their counterparts in Mexico and the United States.

Table 2


Indicators of Economic Opportunity				
Country	Population Growth	Unemployment	GDP Capita (PPP)	Poverty Level
Belize	2.3%	12.9%	\$6,500	33%
Costa Rica	1.5%	6.6%	\$9,600	18%
El Salvador	1.8%	6.3%*	\$4,900	36%
Guatemala	2.6%	7.5%	\$4,200	75%
Honduras	2.2%	28.5%	\$2,800	53%
Mexico	1.2%	3.2%*	\$9,600	40%
Nicaragua	1.9%	7.8%*	\$2,300	50%
Panama	1.3%	12.6%	\$6,900	37%
United States	0.9%	5.5%	\$40,100	12%
*Represents significant levels of underemployment also present				
Source: CIA World Fact Book (2005)				

Moreover, there are strong pull factors—established communities and family members—luring individuals to migrate to the United States. The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that there are 40.4 million Hispanics living in the United States.<sup>5</sup> Of the 40.4 million living in the United States, nearly half (18 million) are foreign born, indicating that Latin American migrants are able to find well-established communities in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Texas, where

<sup>5</sup> "Trends 2005," The Pew Research Center. Pg. 80 <<http://pewresearch.org/trends/trends2005-hispanic.pdf>>

almost 80% of Hispanics reside<sup>6</sup> and are willing to assist migrants in finding jobs.<sup>7</sup> In addition, surveys from the Mexican Migration Project have determined that UDAs from Mexico increasingly have social networks established in the United States to assist them in the journey. In 1965, nineteen percent of surveyed households had access to at least one sibling in the United States with 1.7 siblings as the average.<sup>8</sup> By 1991, a similar survey found that forty-one percent of households had access to at least one sibling with most households have an average of 2.3.<sup>9</sup>

Table 3



However, this traditional approach to qualifying the migration decision into “push” and “pull” factors as the prime determinants suffers from serious drawbacks. First, push and pull factors are at best an *ex post facto* description of successful migration. Certainly, push and/or pull factors were important in the decision to migrate and the choice of the final destination. But attributing the migration decision solely to these factors does not provide insight into the decision making process of another person who decided against migrating. In short, if person A and person B experience the same push and pull factors, why does person A choose to remain while person B chooses to migrate? A tangent critique is the lack of scalability. If push factors increase (decrease) and pull factors remain the same, will this lead to an increase (decrease) in migration? Rather, a potentially more constructive approach is to frame the migration decision into a

<sup>6</sup> Ibid Pg. 84

<sup>7</sup> Ibid Pg. 80

<sup>8</sup> Pia M. Orrenius, “Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Along the U.S.–Mexico Border: An Overview.” *The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas*. First Quarter 2001.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

parsimonious cost-benefit analysis. Doing so, Arizona can best determine which policies are most appropriate especially in light of its limited regulatory power and resources.

There are several assumptions needed to construct such a cost-benefit analysis. One overriding assumption is that legal migration is not an option for a migrant to the United States. Given the high demand to migrate to the United States and the few available U.S. employment visas, illegal migration is typically seen as the only available option for many. Other assumptions include that income, ties with family—it is assumed that benefits from familial relations increases as a percentage of their presence in a particular location—and political and economic freedoms are the most important factors leading to migration. Under these assumptions, the benefits a migrant receives from emigrating to the United States are the real wage, the level of economic and political freedom, and the percentage of family members or relatives in the United States. There are certainly other factors that come into play during the decision to migrate. Not all illegal migrants are in good standing with law enforcement in their country of origin. Additionally, some migrants are likely escaping familial or social obligations. As such, emigrating to the United States is an effective way to escape these obligations and criminal prosecution.

Naturally, there are also tradeoffs in deciding to migrate. Migrants will leave jobs and family members in the origin country. Moreover, the level of economic and political freedom in the origin country may not be so different from the United States. Additionally, migrants will encounter other costs such as the transaction costs of the journey. Depending on the origin of the migrant, these include the smuggling fee, travel costs, bribes to law enforcement or rival smuggling groups, and information costs like finding smugglers and the safest route to the United States. Taking into account law enforcement activities yields an additional cost for would-be migrants. If apprehended, migrants face additional costs e.g. time away from work, and administrative penalties. Finally, there is a risk of death or bodily injury. This is especially true of today's smuggling operations which place migrants in precarious situations. Consequently, a migrant must sum of all these costs to compare against the expected benefits of migrating to the United States.

To make the analysis more reflective of the real world, it is assumed that the real wage and apprehension costs are not absolute. Rather, the real wages in both countries and apprehension costs fluctuate according to the likelihood of securing employment and being detected and prosecuted successfully. As such, a relatively higher probability of securing employment in the origin country may, *ceteris paribus*, outweigh any additional gains in the real wage in the United States. Likewise, an increased likelihood of detection and prosecution for entering into the United State illegally will lead to higher apprehension costs.

Table 4

Cost-Benefit Analysis for Migration to the United States	
<b>Cost Variables</b>	
Real wage in home country =	$W_{r*home}$
Political freedom in home country =	$F_{*home}$
Economic opportunity in home country =	$E_{o*home}$

% of relatives and family in home country =	$R_{home}$
Transaction costs (smuggling fees, travel costs, time, etc.) =	TC
Danger (risk of death or harm) =	D
Apprehension Costs =	A
<b>Benefit Variables</b>	
Real wage in U.S. =	$W_{r*us}$
Political freedom in US =	$F_{*us}$
Economic opportunity in US =	$E_{o*us}$
% of relatives and family in U.S. =	$R_{us}$
Escaping from familial and social obligations	O
Freedom from escaping prosecution in home country	E
<b>Intervening Variables</b>	
Probability of US Employment =	$P_{e*us}$
Probability of Home Employment =	$P_{e*home}$
Probability of Detection =	$P_d$
Probability of Prosecution =	$P_{pros}$

$[(W_{r*us} * P_{e*us}) / (W_{r*home} * P_{e*home}) + (F_{*us} + E_{o*us}) + (F_{*home} + E_{o*home}) + R_{us} / R_{home} + O + E] > [D + (P_d * P_{pros} * A) + TC]$ , then migrate.

Arizona's strategy has been to combat crimes associated with illegal migration e.g. auto theft, criminal trespassing, human smuggling, money laundering, and drug smuggling through use of UDAs. Since the prevalence of these crimes rise with the supply of migrants entering through Arizona into the United States, Arizona should attempt to alter the calculus behind migrating to the United States. Unfortunately, the above equation shows that many of these factors lie outside of reach of the Arizona state government's ability. These factors include influence over real wages in the United States and origin country, the probability of securing employment in the United States and the origin country, the level of political and economic freedom in the United States and origin country, the number of relatives present in the United State and the origin country, and familial and social obligations. In the end, Arizona's efforts to control violence and secondary crimes may only affect such variables as the risk of danger during migration, the probability of detection and prosecution for entering illegally, and transactions costs such as smuggling fees and transportation costs.

### Stocks and Flows of the UDA Population

Determining the stock and flow of undocumented aliens is important to extrapolating the size of human smuggling and potential future flows. Undocumented aliens (UDA) can reduce several of the costs of migration and increase its benefits by following in the footsteps of their countrymen, who due to familial or cultural ties share information about employment opportunities and entering illegally. Alas, since UDAs remain outside of the official economy—they typically lack property, bank accounts, etc.—it is difficult to create an accurate enumeration. Nonetheless, estimates from several sources exist in the open-source literature. These estimates on the UDA population come from several data sources and subject to different assumptions. The reader should be wary that many estimates are used to justify a political viewpoint.

### *Low Estimates of the Undocumented Population*

The lowest estimate of the UDA population is from government sources. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) legacy agency, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), known now as the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), estimated in 2003 that there were 7 million UDAs residing in the United States. They further estimated that 500,000 UDAs were entering annually. Based on this estimate, there were approximately 8 million UDAs in the United States at the beginning of 2005. DHS created its estimate from U.S. Census data on the foreign born population without citizenship and subtracted the number of deceased and apprehended aliens, those receiving legal status, and aliens who returned to their countries. Some organizations and experts believe that DHS underestimates the UDA population. They point out that the U.S. Census frequently undercounts UDAs. These same critics frequently use anecdotal evidence—the Brazilian consulate reports nearly ten times more Brazilians residing in New York than U.S. government estimates—to support their case. Recognizing potential flaws in U.S. Census data, the Pew Hispanic Center attempted to correct for these deficiencies in its estimate of the undocumented population. The Center found the total number of undocumented aliens to be 10.3 million in 2004, of which, 80%~85% were of Mexican origin.<sup>10</sup> The Center came to this conclusion by somewhat arbitrarily revising U.S. Census numbers.<sup>11</sup>

### *High Estimates of the Undocumented Population*

Organizations opposed to illegal immigration frequently espouse higher estimates for the undocumented population. Most of these numbers are based on a Bear Sterns report. According to the Bear Sterns report, the undocumented population could be as high as 20 million.<sup>12</sup> The logic behind this estimate is that increases in remittances, school enrollment, and housing are higher than what would be expected under normal population growth, government estimates on the undocumented population, and estimates of the income levels of the undocumented population. However, the authors of the report fail to demonstrate why the estimate should be 20 million and do not address important issues such as migrant workers and the legalization of one part of the undocumented population. Since as many as 183,000 undocumented workers receive legal status each year<sup>13</sup>, they do not appear in government statistics, although statistics would continue to record their remittances. Moreover, temporary workers—potentially numbering at a million and whose remittances are recorded in statistics—are excluded from government estimates. These same temporary workers and their children would show up in enrollment and housing statistics. UDAs may also have experienced productivity gains, leading to large sums of remittances back to their origin countries. In short, there are many other potential explanations for what the authors point to as evidence of a larger

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<sup>10</sup> Estimates were derived from the 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS) and the U.S. Census 200. Jeffrey S. Passel, "Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics." Background Briefing Prepared for Task Force on Immigration and America's Future. Pew Hispanic Center June 14, 2005.

<sup>11</sup> Using prior studies showing that the U.S. Census undercounted unauthorized aliens by 10% and Mexicans 6-8%, the Pew Hispanic Center revised U.S. Census calculations.

<sup>12</sup> Robert Justich and Betty Ng. "The Underground Labor Force is Rising to the Surface." Bear Sterns Asset Management. January 3, 2005.

<sup>13</sup> "Illegal Immigration." Center for Immigration Studies Homepage <http://www.cis.org/topics/illegalimmigration.html>

UDA population. Finally, some of the remittances are payments for illegal immigration, which have risen dramatically in recent years as the price of illegal immigration has risen.

The debate over the number of undocumented aliens remains divisive in the media as well. A Time Magazine article estimated that there were 15 million UDAs in the United States.<sup>14</sup> However, the authors are said to have based this off government calculations and their knowledge of the issue. Some mainstream media sources such as CNN have decided to split the difference by declaring that there are 7-20 million UDAs in the United States.<sup>15</sup>

Table 5

Estimates of Stock of Undocumented Aliens in the United States							
DHS-ICE (2005)	Pew Hispanic Center (2004)	Bear Sterns Estimate (2005)	Urban Institute (2002) <sup>16</sup>	Center for Immigration Studies (2004) <sup>17</sup>	Time Magazine (2004)	Current Population Survey (March 2004)	CNN (2004)
8 million	10.3 million	20 million	9.3 million	9 million	15 million	11 million	7-20 million

### *Annual Flow*

Calculating the flow of UDAs into the United States is equally troubling. One method would be to compare two estimates during a given period to find annual and daily flows. However, since many UDAs make several attempts before successfully entering the United States, this method undercounts the number of UDAs potentially using the services of *polleros*. As such, in discussing flows, it is important to distinguish between attempts and successes. By doing so, one can approximate the current and potential market-size of human smuggling along the Southwest border.

The DHS estimate of 7 million UDAs in 2003 is 2 million more than in October 1996. This corresponds roughly to 285,714 UDAs entering annually between 1997 and 2003.<sup>18</sup> However, a DHS publication in 2003 determined that the undocumented population was growing at 350,000 annually through 1990-2000.<sup>19</sup> One answer to this discrepancy is that a greater number of UDAs crossed in the early part of the surveyed years than in the

<sup>14</sup> Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele. "Who Left the Door Open?" Time Magazine Online Edition. September 20, 2004.

<sup>15</sup> Transcripts from "Immigrant Nation: Divide Country," CNN Presents. Aired October 17, 2004. <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0410/17/cp.01.html>

<sup>16</sup> Jeffrey S. Passel, Randolph Capps, & Michael E. Fix. "Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and Figures," The Urban Institute. January 12, 2004

<sup>17</sup> 2004 estimate by using the Center for Immigration Studies' figures and assumptions. "Illegal Immigration," Center for Immigration Studies Homepage. <http://www.cis.org/topics/illegalimmigration.html>

<sup>18</sup> In calculating flow, October 1997 was rounded to 1998. This yields 2 million divided over 7 years.

<sup>19</sup> "Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: 1990-2000" The Department of Homeland Security. January 31, 2003.

[http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/III\\_Report\\_1211.pdf](http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/III_Report_1211.pdf)

latter. Another is that many of the 350,000 UDAs entering into the United States legalized, returned to their home countries, or became deceased.

The Pew Hispanic Center's conclusions on the annual flow of undocumented aliens were that 65% of its estimated 10.3 million arrived illegally during the 1995-2004 period.<sup>20</sup> This would correspond to 669,500 annually over that ten year period. The Pew Hispanic Center further estimated that during the same period approximately 400,000-485,000 illegal migrants arrived annually from Mexico.<sup>21</sup> The large discrepancy between the DHS and Pew Hispanic Center results from the Pew Hispanic Center's upward adjustment of U.S. Census numbers to reflect the undercounted number of foreign-born in the United States. Not surprisingly, Time Magazine reported a significantly higher estimate—3 million—for UDAs entering annually.<sup>22</sup> However, the authors of the Time Magazine article did not report how they calculated this number.

Table 6

Estimated Flow of UDA in the US (Successful Entry and Continued Residence) <sup>23</sup>				
DHS Reported Flows	Calculated DHS Flows	Pew Hispanic Center	Pew Hispanic Center (Mexican Nationals)	Time Magazine
350,000	285,714	669,500	400,000-485,000	3,000,000

The above estimates provide a sense of the number of individuals successfully entering the country. However, many undocumented aliens will have tried multiple times to enter and re-enter the United States. A common rule of thumb is that the Border Patrol only apprehends 20%~30% of UDAs entering the United States.<sup>24</sup> Using this rule-of-thumb and DHS Southwest Border apprehension statistics<sup>25</sup>, we can roughly approximate the daily flow of UDAs. Between FY2000 and FY2004, there were on average 1,170,710 apprehensions annually on the Southwest border or approximately 3,207 a day.<sup>26</sup> Using the rule-of-thumb stated above, there are between 10,691 and 16,037 UDAs who attempt to cross the Southwest border daily and between 3,901,850 and 5,853,505 annually.

<sup>20</sup> Estimates were derived from the 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS) and the U.S. Census 200. Jeffrey S. Passel, "Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics." Background Briefing Prepared for Task Force on Immigration and America's Future. Pew Hispanic Center June 14, 2005.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid

<sup>22</sup> Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele. "Who Left the Door Open?" Time Magazine Online Edition. September 20, 2004.

<sup>23</sup> These numbers exclude deportations, deaths, and returnees.

<sup>24</sup> Leo W. Banks. "Images From the Battleground," The Tucson Weekly August 11, 2005.

<sup>25</sup> DHS Southwest Border apprehension statistics record apprehensions of the same undocumented alien separately.

<sup>26</sup> Individuals apprehended more than once are not recorded again. This means that apprehension numbers are actually higher than reported.

Table 7

Estimated Annual and Daily UDA Flow Along Southwest Border (individuals)					
Annual Avg. SW Border Apprehensions (2000-2004)	Daily Avg. SW Border Apprehensions	Assume 80% Success Rate (Annual)	Assume 80% Success Rate (Daily)	Assume 70% Success Rate (Annual)	Assume 70% Success Rate (Daily)
1,170,710	3,207	5,853,505	16,037	3,901,850	10,691

### Nationality and Socio-Economic Composition of UDA

While estimates regarding the UDA population vary from source to source, all estimates have concluded that the Latin American population makes up the vast majority of the UDA population. The U.S. Census estimated that 63% of the UDA population entering between 1990 and 2000 was from Latin America.<sup>27</sup> DHS reports slightly higher estimates with Mexicans making up 69% of the UDA population in 2000.<sup>28</sup> The Pew Hispanic Center determined that Mexicans make up 57% of the UDA population followed by Central Americans comprising another 24%. While the UDA population remains predominately Mexican, there is growing number of Central Americans attempting entry into the United States. The Border Patrol's Tucson Sector reported an increase of 86% of Central American detainees.<sup>29</sup> A *Cuarto Poder* article citing the Secretary of the *Comisión de Población y Desarrollo del Senado de la República* (the Mexican Republic Senate Committee on Population and Development) noted that 1 million undocumented people would cross the southern border of Mexico in 2005.<sup>30</sup> Of this one million, less than 550,000 undocumented people would succeed in crossing into the United States.<sup>31</sup>

### Socio-Economic Characteristics of the UDA Population

The typical UDA is comparatively young and uneducated by U.S. standards. The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that 72% of the UDA population is between the age of 18 and 39.<sup>32</sup> An additional 17% is under the age of 18.<sup>33</sup> Research from the Pew Hispanic Center also found that most UDAs from Mexico had little education. (Compulsory education in Mexico is through 8<sup>th</sup> grade.) The Pew Hispanic Center found that 32% of illegal Mexican migrants had less than a 9<sup>th</sup> grade education, 17% had completed some education between 9<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> grade, while 25% had a high school diploma.<sup>34</sup> The

<sup>27</sup> United States Census 2000.

<sup>28</sup> "Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: 1990-2000" The Department of Homeland Security. January 31, 2003.

<sup>29</sup> Chris Hawley. "Mexico Has Problem with Migrants, Too." The Arizona Republic. August 15, 2005.

<sup>30</sup> "450 Mil Inmigrantes Se Establecerán Aquí." *Cuarto Poder*. July 1, 2005

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>32</sup> Jeffrey S. Passel. "Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population," The Pew Hispanic Center. March 21, 2005.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>34</sup> Estimates were derived from the 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS) and the U.S. Census 2000. Jeffrey S. Passel, "Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics." Background Briefing Prepared for Task Force on Immigration and America's Future. Pew Hispanic Center June 14, 2005.

remaining approximate 25% had acquired some college education or a college degree.<sup>35</sup> According to an analysis of U.S. Census data between 1980-2000, the education level and age structure of Mexican immigrants have not changed dramatically since 1980.<sup>36</sup> Between 1980 and 2000, the percentage of women in the Mexican UDA population has shrunk slightly from 46.5% to 43.7%.<sup>37</sup> Male undocumented aliens are the bread winners for undocumented families. 92% of all illegal male migrants participated in the labor force in contrast to only 56% of women.<sup>38</sup>

### **Destinations for UDAs**

The choice of location for UDA is contingent on two important factors: social network and employment. Historical evidence has shown that immigrants follow their countrymen and family in relocating to new areas. At the same time, the prospects of employment also weigh heavily in the decision process. In the past, typical destinations included California, Texas, Florida, and New York. Since 1990, the “settlement” of illegal aliens has diversified greatly. In 1990, experts estimated that 45% of all illegal aliens lived in California.<sup>39</sup> As of 2004, this share had dropped to only 24%.<sup>40</sup> This reduction has been a result of many illegal aliens settling in Arizona and North Carolina as well as other locations.<sup>41</sup> The DHS legacy agency, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), has determined that Arizona was among the states—California, Texas, Illinois, Georgia, and North Carolina—with the largest numerical increase in the unauthorized population in the 1990s. By 2004, estimates put nearly 500,000 undocumented aliens residing in Arizona.<sup>42</sup>

As many undocumented aliens have limited education, English language ability, and few skills, only limited unskilled employment opportunities are available. Analysis of U.S. Census data and the Current Population Survey shows that labor force participation among undocumented aliens is highly concentrated in labor intensive occupations.<sup>43</sup> The occupations with the highest percentage of illegal migrants are farming, cleaning, construction, food preparation, production, and transportation.<sup>44</sup> These occupations remain important to illegal migrants because they do not require governmental licensing or academic credentials.

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid

<sup>36</sup> David Card & Ethan G. Lewis. “The Diffusion of Mexican Immigrants During the 1990’s: Explanations and Impacts.” The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). January 2005.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid

<sup>38</sup> Estimates were derived from the 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS) and the U.S. Census 200. Jeffrey S. Passel, “Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics.” Background Briefing Prepared for Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future. Pew Hispanic Center June 14, 2005.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

<sup>41</sup> Ibid

<sup>42</sup> Ibid

<sup>43</sup> Ibid

<sup>44</sup> Ibid

## Finding Employment

Under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the DHS legacy agency INS began requiring employers to have all individuals hired in the United States to fill out an I-9 form to verify employment eligibility. A potential employee may use among 27 acceptable forms of identification to prove employment eligibility. Intended as a way to discourage employment of undocumented aliens, use of fraudulent identification by undocumented aliens have thwarted the government's efforts. The General Accounting Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Commission on Immigration Reform have concluded that cheap counterfeited documents and fraudulent use of documents severely undermined the employment verification process.<sup>45</sup> A 1990 report noted that in 36% of INS investigations of employers, fraudulent documents had been used. In most of these cases, undocumented aliens had used INS documents to prove employment eligibility.<sup>46</sup> To combat this, INS began issuing in April of 1998 new Employment Authorization Documents with holograms, a digital picture of the card holder, and a picture of the cardholder's fingerprints. INS plans to replace expired cards issued between 1989 and 1998 with the security enhanced version. However, this will take an additional 3 years for these cardholders to receive their new cards. What is more, cards issued between 1977 and 1989 do not have an expiration date and may never be replaced. Under federal law, aliens may also present other documents such as Social Security cards instead of INS documents to prove employment eligibility. Since Social Security cards lack advanced anti-counterfeiting devices and are widely available illegally, experts believe that undocumented aliens will begin to use Social Security cards in lieu of the security enhanced version of the INS Employment Authorization Document.<sup>47</sup>

Table 8

Fraudulent Documents Seized by INS				
Document Type	FY1998	FY1999	FY2000	FY2001
Border crossing cards	30,631	30,797	38,650	30,419
Alien registration cards	28,137	33,308	34,120	26,259
Nonimmigrant visas	13,551	18,003	17,417	21,127
U.S. passports and citizenship documents	14,546	22,142	17,703	18,925
Foreign passports and citizenship documents	11,245	14,695	15,047	15,994
Reentry permits and refugee travel documents	271	1,107	153	702
Immigrant visas	790	663	447	597
Total	99,171	120,715	123,537	114,023

Source: INS Data cited in Statement of Richard M. Stana Director, Justice Issues, "Identity Fraud: Prevalence and Links to Alien Illegal Activities." *General Accounting Office* GAO-02-830T June 2002

<sup>45</sup> "Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist," The General Accounting Office (GAO) GAO/GGD 99-33 April 1999 pg. 12

<sup>46</sup> Ibid

<sup>47</sup> The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (1996 Act), Public Law 104-208, required the Social Security Administration (SSA) to develop security enhanced versions of the Social Security card. The SSA created security enhanced cards but does not intend to replace issued cards with the new version. "Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist," The General Accounting Office (GAO) GAO/GGD 99-33 April 1999 pg. 17

Table 9

Identity Card Characteristics					
ID Type	Years	Production Location	Estimated circulation	Expiration	No. of Versions
I-151	1950 - 1977	District Offices	0	3/20/96	17
I-551	1977 - 1989	1 site (ICF)	3 million	indefinite	1
I-551	1989 - present	1 site (ICF)	7 million	10 year	1
ARC	1997	1 - 4 sites	N/A	10 year	N/A

Source: "Immigration and Naturalization Service Audit Report: Replacement of Resident Alien Cards," *U.S. Department of Justice*. June 1997.

### Smuggling Methods

Depending on the smuggling distance, illegal use of legitimate travel documents can be an efficient method of smuggling. This method usually entails having the illegal migrant enter on a visa and overstay and then allow the smuggler to reuse the travel documents by substituting photos.<sup>48</sup> There are any number of ruses a smuggler may use to acquire these travel documents. The most direct method is to coach illegal migrants in how to respond in U.S. embassy visa interviews. As part of this process, the smuggler may provide fraudulent job letters, employment records, and bank statements to demonstrate that the visa applicant will return to their home country.<sup>49</sup>

In some countries, smuggling operations exploit the State Department travel agency visa referral program.<sup>50</sup> This program allows travel agencies—set up as front companies for smuggling operations—to process some parts of the visa applications prior to be submitted to overburdened U.S. embassies and consulates. Knowing that the embassies and consulates are unable to investigate travel agencies and visas effectively, the smuggling operation or travel agency will refer several visa applications at one time with the hope that five or six will be approved. A variation of this method may also include use of a "jockey"—someone pretending to be related or associated with the illegal migrant—to escort the illegal migrant and answer questions from immigration officials at ports.<sup>51</sup>

When using fraudulent documents, human smugglers depend heavily upon business (B1) and tourist (B2) visas<sup>52</sup> since in these cases it is easier to create false supporting documents. The value of the particular visa varies according to type and the country of its recipient. For example, it is possible to receive a 10-year multiple re-entry visa for Mexican citizens, but only a three month multiple re-entry for other countries. Naturally, the longer the period of validity, the more times an illegal migrant may use the document

<sup>48</sup> Amy O'Neill Richard, "International Trafficking in Women to the United States: A Contemporary Manifestation of Slavery and Organized Crime," Center for the Study of Intelligence November 1999

<sup>49</sup> Ibid

<sup>50</sup> Ibid

<sup>51</sup> Ibid

<sup>52</sup> Ibid

illegally. In some cases, other types of visas are the preferred method of smuggling people. Student (F1), fiancée (K1) and entertainer visas (P1, P3) and I-20 student forms have been exploited by human smuggling and trafficking rings.<sup>53</sup> When a U.S. visa is too difficult to obtain, smuggling operations have tried to exploit other loopholes in the U.S. immigration laws. In one case, a smuggling operation was found to have used Canada's visa waiver program to bring illegal migrants to the United States.<sup>54</sup> In another case, smugglers have booked an international flight transiting through a U.S. airport en route to another country. Upon arrival to the United States, the undocumented alien met someone associated with the smuggling operation and absconded from the airport.<sup>55</sup>

Despite the use of false travel documents, most human smuggling into the United States uses less sophisticated means. One reason is that the illegal use of documents is much more conducive to trafficking people over large distances, requiring use of the modern transportation system, e.g. airlines and ships. Past trafficking incidents involving Thai, Korean, and Eastern European women have frequently included false travel documents. Smuggling operations along the U.S.-Mexican border, however, have the luxury of proximity to the United States.

### **The Rise of Smuggling Operations Along the U.S.-Mexico Border**

The 1,951 mile border spanning between San Diego, California and Brownsville, Texas provides a large area of operation for smuggling organizations. In the past, San Diego and El Paso were the main transit points for UDAs entering the United States. The ease of entry into the United States was such that many UDAs used family or friends to be smuggled across. In February 1994, the U.S. Attorney General and the INS Commissioner announced a five-part strategy to enforce U.S. immigration laws. The first priority was to initiate a policy of "prevention through deterrence." The goal was to squeeze UDA entry into the deserts and difficult terrain found between the San Diego and El Paso sectors.<sup>56</sup> The U.S. Attorney General and the INS Commissioner anticipated that this would increase the fees that human smugglers charged, complicate the process of illegal entry, and force human smugglers to develop more complex operations.<sup>57</sup> The federal government also predicted that apprehensions would increase at first and then gradually decline as UDA shifted away from traditional crossing points such as San Diego and El Paso to more remote areas such as Tucson.

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid

<sup>54</sup> Ibid

<sup>55</sup> Ibid

<sup>56</sup> Building A Comprehensive Southwest Border Enforcement Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Naturalization Service, June 1996), p. 3.

<sup>57</sup> "Illegal Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation." General Accounting Office. GAO/GGD-99-44 (May 1999) pg 16

Table 8

U.S. AG and INS Commissioner 1994 Plan			
Phase	Area of Operation	Yr Completed	Agent Resources
I	San Diego, CA, El Paso, TX sectors	1998	3,400
II	Tucson, AZ, & Del Rio, Laredo, & McAllen, TX	Incomplete	9,700 (1,770 in Tucson)
III	Remaining sectors along the Southwest Border	N.A.	N.A.
IV	The Northern Border, gulf coast, and costal highways	N.A.	N.A.

In the most recent 5 years of statistics, Southwest Border apprehensions peaked in 2000 and gradually fell until 2003, representing a 44% reduction in apprehensions. Since 2003, apprehensions again began to rise, rising 25% in one year. Given these huge swings in apprehensions, it is unlikely that the past decline in apprehensions can be attributed to the success of “prevention through deterrence.” Rather, it seems more likely that as UDAs have shifted from one area of the border to another, but have not decreased in number. Of those apprehended between 2000 and 2004, almost 95% of apprehensions resulted in voluntary returns. This suggests the possibility that many of those apprehended were individuals apprehended several times.

Table 11

Border Patrol Apprehension Statistics					
	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004
SW Border Apprehensions	1,643,679	1,235,717	929,809	905,065	1,139,282
Voluntary Departure	1,603,038	1,191,047	884,380	836,672	1,020,325
Deportable	48,267	46,093	45,585	48,120	47,842
Inadmissible	137,464	131,359	103,034	133,859	149,950
Criminal Removals	71,801	71,994	70,759	77,710	86,620
Non-Criminal Removals	113,930	105,458	77,860	104,269	111,172
Total Removals	185,731	177,452	148,619	181,979	197,792
	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004
Criminal Alien Cases	44,564	49,456	48,390	49,639	N.A.
Employer Cases	1,186	823	1,127	1,058	N.A.
Fraud Cases	1,758	1,774	1,047	1,389	N.A.
Smuggling Cases	475	445	332	426	N.A.
Adapted from the Office of Immigrations Statistics < <a href="http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/index.htm">http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/index.htm</a> >					


Along the Arizona border with Mexico, there are several areas open to exploitation by human smugglers. In large part, this is due to legislative requirements compelling the Border Patrol to relocate many checkpoints once every 14 days.<sup>58</sup> Besides legislative requirements, the Border Patrol must select locations along major transportation arteries that are safe for travelers and have sufficient operating space. These requirements have led to a limited number of areas where the Border Patrol can set up checkpoints.

Along I-19 from Nogales to Tucson and state highway 83, the Border Patrol put in place permanent checkpoints.<sup>59</sup> To meet its legislative mandates, the Border Patrol also has established “nonpermanent checkpoints” which are opened periodically at the same locations. According to GAO, these nonpermanent checkpoints alternated between KP 42 and KP 25 (as shown on the map) to prevent UDAs and human smugglers from avoiding permanent, and consequently, well known checkpoints farther north on I-19. However, since KP 42 and KP 25 are nonpermanent checkpoints, they remain open for 14 days before shutting down for 8 hours. This effectively gives UDAs and human smugglers an eight-hour window to circumvent permanent check points. In addition to KP 25 and KP 42, other checkpoints open and close to meet congressional requirements.

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<sup>58</sup> There was a congressional ban on funding instituted for permanent checkpoints. In essence, this requires the Border Patrol to relocate checkpoints after a specified period of days. In this case, this specified period is 14 days.

<sup>59</sup> “Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector Performance” *United States Government Accountability Office (GAO)*. Report to Congressional Requesters GAO-05-435 July 2005.



Given the drawback to these nonpermanent checkpoints, the Tucson sector Border Patrol also operates tactical checkpoints periodically. These checkpoints, designated 83C MP54, 83C, and 82, lie on state highway 83. Three additional checkpoints lie north and east of Nogales. These nonpermanent checkpoints designated as SR 90, 80C and highway 191 do not have alternative sites and consequently also provide human smugglers an 8-hour window to conduct smuggling operations. According to GAO, Border Patrol runs roving patrols at night to prevent UDAs and smugglers from exploiting this weakness in patrol.

To date, a majority of the Border Patrol's checkpoints remain centered around the Nogales area as per Phase II of the "prevention through deterrence" strategy. However, there remain large open areas, especially around the Tohono O'odham Reservation, that provide smugglers the opportunity to circumvent checkpoints. While the Department of Homeland recognizes that these areas are not covered sufficiently, it believes these areas are sufficiently difficult to cross and have led to fewer successful entries into the United States.

Despite the federal government's efforts, there is little evidence that the flow of UDAs into the United States has slowed. Rather, as border enforcement has increased, the subsequent demand for *pollero* services has increased the number of smuggling operations. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated in 1999 that

70% of illegal aliens from Mexico used *polleros* to assist them crossing the border.<sup>60</sup> ICE estimates that this percentage has risen since 1999. The increased use of *pollero* services has also increased the number of entrants into the smuggling market. The subsequent competition has created a variety of services a *pollero* may provide to differentiate themselves from competitors, with some smuggling operations beginning to offer a range of services from assistance in crossing without inspection to safe houses, transportation to interior location, and links to employers.<sup>61</sup> In general, most smuggling operations remain far less sophisticated, packing large numbers of illegal migrants into containers to smuggle then across the border. This type of smuggling has increasingly become the preferred means as it requires little investment and allows the organization to respond rapidly to changes in the business such as increased vigilance by law enforcement. At the same time, this type of smuggling also lends itself to opportunists or first-timers interested in entering into the smuggling business.

### **The Business Model of Human Smuggling**

Louise Shelley at the American University's Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) has developed 5 broad business models for trafficking and smuggling based on the political, economic, and cultural circumstances present in the source country and the unique characteristics of the criminal organization. Although the models were developed for human trafficking, they illuminate the reasoning behind the modus operandi for human smuggling along the U.S.-Mexico border. Additionally, comparing the business model behind Chinese trafficking operations and Mexican smuggling demonstrates why smuggling is more rampant than trafficking along the border.

#### *Trade and Development Model*

The Trade and Development Model, as coined by Shelley, shows a high level of sophistication and organization. Chinese traffickers, also known as snakeheads, have vertically integrated all aspects of the trafficking operation from recruitment to debt bondage or forced labor in brothels to ensure complete control. The success of the Chinese traffickers is such that they have connections in over 51 countries.<sup>62</sup> Chinese smugglers charge exorbitant smuggling fees, averaging \$50,000<sup>63</sup> well beyond the Chinese GDP per capita of \$5,600.<sup>64</sup> Due to this high cost, snakeheads agree to receive a portion of the fee later through forced bondage in the destination country or through a "pay-as-you-go" at overseas staging points.<sup>65</sup> From a legal standpoint, the model is

<sup>60</sup> According to a 1999 International Organization for Migration study as cited in: James O. Finckenauer and Jennifer Schrock. "Human Trafficking: A Growing Criminal Market in the U.S." International Center National Institute of Justice

<sup>61</sup> Susan F Martin. "Smuggling and Trafficking in Humans: A Human Rights Issue" Prepared for "Best Practices for Migrant Workers" June 19-20, 2000 Santiago, Chile <http://www.iom.int/documents/officialtxt/en/susan%5Fmartin%5F2.pdf>

<sup>62</sup> Seth Mydans. "Chinese smugglers' lucrative cargo: Humans," New York Times, March 21, 1992: A1.

<sup>63</sup> Sheldon Zhang & Ko-lin Chin. "Characteristics of Chinese Human Smugglers: A Cross-National Study, Final Report," Final Report to the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice. October 2002. <http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/grants/200607.pdf>

<sup>64</sup> GDP per capita was adjusted for purchasing power parity. "World Fact Book," The Central Intelligence Agency. (2004)

<sup>65</sup> GDP per capita was adjusted for purchasing power parity. "World Fact Book," The Central Intelligence Agency. (2004)

trafficking, but from the point of view of both parties it may just be “smuggling-on-lay-away.” One positive aspect of the model is that the traffickers have an incentive to protect the trafficked persons and their investment by maintaining a good reputation within source communities to recruit future customers. In fact, Chinese traffickers in the United States generally free smuggled Chinese after payment of debts. To launder their proceeds, snakeheads wire transfer or use the underground Chinese banking system and funnel the money into northern Thailand and southern China for investment in legitimate businesses.<sup>66</sup>

### *The Supermarket Model*

In contrast, the business model for smuggling operations along the border is a so-called “Supermarket Model,” given the focus on low cost and high volume.<sup>67</sup> By focusing on economies of scale, smugglers can move large numbers of people for smaller fees. From the UDA’s perspective, these smuggling services are affordable and safe—payment does not occur until successful entry. In the event of apprehension, the UDA also has the advantage of being able to try again. As such, unlike the Chinese model, the small fee and payment-on-delivery aspect of the Supermarket model does not lend itself to trafficking.<sup>68</sup> At the same time, the low smuggling fee per person does not provide an incentive for the human smuggler to protect the life of the smuggled person. To date, there have been several incidents where smugglers have abandoned people in the desert or subjected them to other dangerous situations.

### **Necessary Elements for a Successful Smuggling Operation**

A key feature of the smuggling strategy along the U.S.-Mexico border is its relatively low entry costs and lack of vertical integration. Unlike other smuggling and trafficking operations, the seemingly endless demand for smuggling services allows most smugglers to rely on word-of-mouth advertising. Nevertheless, the operations still depend upon four elements to succeed: transportation, bribes for public officials, stash houses, and a means of repatriating profits. Each of these elements plays an important part during the process of smuggling a UDA to the United States. Transportation is important for delivering people quickly and surreptitiously across Mexico, to stash houses, and across the border. Stash house operate as transit points to final destinations within the United States and as a holding facility until payment for *pollero* services is received. Bribes for U.S. and Mexican public officials assist entry into the United States and prevent law enforcement interdiction of their human cargo. The final element, repatriation of profits, may occur through several wire transfers, hand delivery, or other means.

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<sup>66</sup> Louise Shelley, “Trafficking in Women: The Business Model Approach.” Pg 5-9

<sup>67</sup> Ibid; Louise Shelley, Director of the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, American University, “Statement to the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights June 25, 2003

<sup>68</sup> The Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) also notes that UDAs coming from the U.S.-Mexican border are able to find employment and are thus less susceptible to trafficking. This is not to say that trafficking does not occur. In one well-known case, traffickers forced deaf Mexican children to panhandle in the streets, while another involved forcing young girls into prostitution.

### *Transportation*

Human smugglers use a variety of means of transportation. Within Mexico, human smugglers have used tractor-trailers, commuter buses, trains, and private automobiles to ferry people across Mexico. Once in a border state such as Sonora, human smuggles rely on private cars as the transportation choice into the United States. The choice of transportation depends on the group, location, and the distance to traverse. For example, in Chiapas, many illegal migrants from Central America board trains to reach the interior parts of Mexico. Upon arriving to a predestined location, the illegal migrants may be hidden in false compartments in tractor trailers or private automobiles. Some illegal migrants have used commuter busses to reach other destinations in Mexico. Finally, in a limited number of cases, illegal migrants from Central America have used to boats to enter into parts of Mexico to reach the U.S. border.

In the United States, some illegal aliens use stolen cars awaiting them to travel to assigned destinations.<sup>69</sup> Other times, aliens will assemble in predetermined areas to be transported en masse to the next destination. Increasingly, shuttle services are being used to transport aliens from the Tucson area to stash house in the Phoenix area. This follows the practice of using shuttle services in Mexico to shepherd UDAs and migrants to different parts of Mexico.

### *Public Corruption*

Depending on the Mexican state, public officials may be clearly involved in human smuggling. In the past two years, there have been several newspaper articles regarding corruption at the National Migration Institute (INM), local police officials, and the military. In one particular noteworthy case, an INM smuggling ring was exposed leading to the arrest of several officials across Mexico. In general, human smugglers operating in Mexico try to avoid the scrutiny of public officials.

### *Stash Houses*

Stash houses are critical to obfuscating the smuggling operation and detaining illegal migrants until payment is received. Since the journey's distance can be quite extensive—from Guatemala to Phoenix is over 1800 miles, while from Mexico City to Phoenix is 1245 miles—migrants and smugglers also require stash houses to house migrants and smugglers to recuperate from the travails for the journey. Many times human smugglers charge illegal migrants for staying at stash houses. In one reported case in *La Opinion* in Veracruz, Mexico, a human smuggler arrested on May 8, 2004 charged between 50-100 (\$5~\$10) pesos per day per person for room and board.<sup>70</sup> In Altar, Sonora, *The Arizona Republic* stated that residents reportedly provide housing to illegal migrants for \$3 a night.<sup>71</sup> In addition to their use during the journey, stash houses are important in the

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<sup>69</sup> Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, "Who Left the Door Open?" Time Magazine Online Edition September 20, 2004

<sup>70</sup> "AFI Captures 'Pollero' Ring; Detains Four Illegal Migrants," *La Opinion*. May 10, 2004.

<sup>71</sup> "In Altar, Teeming with Transients, Small Town Shares Arizona's Conflicts over Impact of Illegal Immigration," *The Arizona Republic* Online Print Edition. August 22, 2005

United States as holding centers until receipt of payment from the relatives of illegal migrants.

### *Repatriation*

The most important component of any criminal operation is the funneling and obfuscation of profits. This can present problems depending on the type of organization and the business model behind the criminal operation. Mexico-based smuggling operations operate on a “payment upon arrival” principle where many times the fee for smuggling is paid by a family member or friend in another part of the United States rather than the smuggled UDA. Given the potential distance between the payer and payee, a convenient a rapid means of transferring monetary payment is critical. Moreover, *polleros* run into the additional problem of having to use a method that UDAs know and allow both parties to remain anonymous. These three characteristics are found in money remitting agents.

A survey conducted by the *Pew Research Center* indicates that many nationalities among illegal immigrants do not open bank accounts. Those nationalities answering more than 50% no to the question, “Do you have a bank account?” included: Colombians (53%), Salvadorians (64.3%), Guatemalans (68.8%), Hondurans (70.7%), and Mexicans (75.2%). When a similar study was conducted in 2002, many illegal immigrants stated that lack of proper identification, distrust of financial institutions, and their intention to return to their home country as reasons for not opening a bank account. It is thus no surprise that remittances remain a cash-to-cash business.<sup>1</sup> However, this may change as more illegal migrants acquire *matriculas*<sup>1</sup>—identification for illegal immigrants—or exploit new service companies whose services straddle the U.S.-Mexican border. Increasingly, U.S. financial institutions such as Citibank and Wells Fargo are accepting *matriculas* issued by illegal immigrants’ U.S. based consulates and embassies as a form of identification to open accounts. Additionally, companies such as *Construmex*, *Grupo Famsa*, and *Hipotecaria Su Casita* have begun to offer services in Mexico through stores located in the United States. It is likely that Mexicans will use these services more frequently to short-cut transaction costs associated with remittance services.

However, the *Pew Research Center* has concluded through a survey of illegal immigrants that many would use the commercial banking sector if they were more knowledgeable and were sure of its safety in protecting their identity and assets.

Traditionally, money remitting agents were the only means for people to send money to family, friends, or business associates in an emergency. In recent years as ATMs have become ubiquitous, money remitting agents have shifted from being a monetary entity of last resort to a critical one for the “unbanked,” UDA, and criminal community.<sup>72</sup> Since this community typically lacks many of the things establishing economic identity e.g. social security cards and credit cards, money remitters collect a minimal amount of identifying information for a transaction. Another attractive feature of money remitting agents is their ability to receive and pay money instantly worldwide and the scale of their operations. Every year, UDAs send billions of dollars to their home countries. This

<sup>72</sup> This community includes those people who do not have a bank account for financial reasons, do not have access to bank accounts for credit reasons, and those not familiar with traditional banking due to linguistic, cultural, or other factors.

sizable amount of money obfuscates the money laundering process for criminal operations, complicating law enforcement efforts.

This is particularly true in the case of Mexico. Over the last five years, money remittance to Mexico has grown quickly. In 2001 money remitted to Mexico was \$9.2 billion.<sup>73</sup> By 2003, money remitted to Mexico had grown 43% to \$13.2 billion.<sup>74</sup> The Pew Hispanic Center notes that 6 million immigrants across the United States remit money to their families regularly with nearly 70% using money remitting agents.<sup>75</sup> Fifty-six percent of UDAs surveyed also reported remitting between \$100 and \$300 a month.<sup>76</sup> The lucrative nature of money remittance has attracted several new entrants. The increased supply of money remitters has lowered the cost of a remittance to an average of 4.4%.<sup>77</sup>

There are generally two agents involved in remitting money: the remitting agent and distributor. For remittances to Mexico, the major remitting agents in the United States include Western Union, Dolex, Vigo, MoneyGram, Sigue, Ria Envía, Orlandi Valuta, and Mexico Express.<sup>78</sup> These companies contract some of their services to distributing agents in Mexico or establish these agents themselves. Major distributing agents in Mexico include Banamex, BBVA-Bancomer, HSBC, and BanNorte.<sup>79</sup> In Central America, Western Union works exclusively with Airpak while in the English Caribbean it works with Grace Kennedy.<sup>80</sup>

Money remitting companies in the United States must comply with federal, state, and sometimes municipal statutes. There are currently 1,596 agents in Arizona with 1,366 agents with transactions of \$500 or more. Of these, over 1000 agents are in the Phoenix metropolitan area while over 250 agents are in Tucson. These money remitting agents must record identifiable information regarding the sender and the recipient as according to A.R.S. § 6-1241 and 31 U.S.C. §5313.<sup>81</sup> This identifiable information is recorded in what are known as Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) when \$10,000 is transferred in a transaction or in a series of transactions. Filings of CTRs are sent to the Treasury Department and are accessible to the Arizona Attorney General's Office. Arizona and federal law, A.R.S. § 6-1241 and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324 and 5325, respectively, require

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<sup>73</sup> Manuel Orozco, "The Remittance Marketplace: Prices, Policy and Financial Institutions." The Pew Hispanic Center June 2004 pg. 5 <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/28.pdf>

<sup>74</sup> Ibid pg. 5

<sup>75</sup> "Remittance Senders and Receivers: Tracking the Transnational Channels," The Pew Hispanic Center. Washington, D.C. November 24, 2003 pg. 3

<sup>76</sup> Ibid pg. 4

<sup>77</sup> Ibid pg. 5

<sup>78</sup> Ibid pg. 12

<sup>79</sup> Ibid pg. 8

<sup>80</sup> Ibid pg. 8

<sup>81</sup> There are additional federal statutes covering money laundering. Enacted in 1970, the Bank Secrecy Act—Public Law 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970)—created the U.S. government's framework for preventing, detecting, and prosecuting money laundering. The Bank Secrecy Act, among other things, is also a record-keeping and reporting law. The USA Patriot Act in 2001 expanded provisions to prevent, detect, and prosecute terrorist financing and extended anti-money laundering requirements to financial service providers previously not covered.

money remitters to obtain identification on a transaction or a series of contemporaneous transactions in currency of \$3,000 or more.

Since August 2002, Arizona introduced additional reporting requirements for money remitters. Under A.R.S. § 6-1241(E), money remitters must obtain identification for each transaction in an amount of \$1,000 or more. The money remitting agents must obtain the name and social security or tax payer identification number, if any, for the individual presenting the transaction and the person and/or the entity on whose behalf the transaction is conducted. It should be noted, however, that the average remittance (\$300) is far below the reporting threshold.<sup>82</sup> Therefore, potential money launderers can disguise their remittances among the multitude of UDA remittances.

### **Overview of Smuggling Operations**

Worldwide criminal organizations involved in smuggling run the gamut from entrepreneurs exploiting an opportunity to “mom and pop,” to large organized criminal operations. In Mexico, smuggling operations are diverse. The level of organization, individuals involved, and method is dependent upon the operation’s location, the necessary geographical features to traverse, migration history of the location, and the nationality of the person smuggled. Most smugglers operate in carefully carved niche markets and generally rely on word-of-mouth to advertise their services. However, law enforcement has uncovered larger operations that openly recruit individuals from Central America for the journey to the United States as well as those run out of the *Instituto de Nacional Migracion*. Mexico lends itself as a major source of migration and an ideal transit point to the United States. The scale is such that Deputy Interior Secretary Javier Moctezuma Barragan reported in 2003 that 108 well organized *pollero* rings were operating in Mexico.<sup>83</sup> In 2004 another estimate placed the number at 120 such groups involving 15,000 people.<sup>84</sup>

A review of open-source literature over the last two years in the U.S. and Mexico indicates that there are very few groups controlling the entire business and many opportunists seeking to exploit the large flow of migrants heading north. While there are 108-120 well organized smuggling operations estimated to be in Mexico, news sources from the Mexican media indicate that many smaller and less sophisticated operations have also proliferated. The size and sophistication of operations vary according to the Mexican state and nationality of the illegal migrant. Mexican nationals from states with a long history of migration use well-established smuggling networks comprised of social contacts. In Mexican states along the U.S. border, gangs, organized crime, and one-time opportunists are heavily involved in human smuggling. This is also true in Mexican states bordering Guatemala. In Mexican states that lie between these Border States, human

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<sup>82</sup>This average fee is the collective average of several remittances over a month period. Manuel Orozco, “The Remittance Marketplace: Prices, Policy and Financial Institutions.” The Pew Hispanic Center June 2004 pg. 8

<sup>83</sup> “Interior Secretariat Reports 108 ‘Pollero’ Rings in Country,” Tapachula El Orbe. June 7, 2003 as found in “Highlights: Mexico Security Issues June 7-9 2003” FBIS Text LAP20030609000085

<sup>84</sup> “Alien-Smuggling Power Equals Drug Trafficking,” *La Opinion*. June 14, 2004. FBIS LAP20040614000100

smugglers tend to be involved in only transporting illegal migrants to other places within Mexico.

## Part II

### Introduction

The following sections provide a rough overview of the groups, methodology, and fees charged in different states in Mexico. Particular attention has been paid to Mexico's southern Border States and states along the Arizona border. This information was collected from Mexican and U.S. newspapers over a two year period. In some cases, the routes used by Mexican smugglers were deduced by looking at road maps in Mexico and the areas where smugglers were apprehended.

### Hidalgo, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and Michoacan

In the past, nearly all human smuggling operations in Mexico were small operations run by families or entrepreneurs willing to provide a service to their countrymen. These operations were necessary to transport people from within the interior of Mexico to easily traversable border areas. In *Hidalgo, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and Michoacan*, which have a long history of migration to the United States, experts note that residents know the identity and modus operandi of human smugglers.<sup>85</sup> In these states, smuggling operations are so well-established and trusted that residents provide *de facto* protection to smugglers.<sup>86</sup> Rather than use an unknown *pollero*, family members approach would-be migrants with documents and passage already prearranged with trusted *polleros*, who have assisted other family members in the past. While in other states gangs and organized criminal elements have overtaken family operations, residents in *Hidalgo, Michoacan, and Zacatecas*, continue to use family-run smuggling operations, leaving the states virtually free of gangs and organized crime.<sup>87</sup>

### Sonora

In contrast, smuggling gangs and other criminal organizations are deeply involved in human smuggling in Sonora. The Mexican government's *Instituto de Nacional Migracion* (INM), National Security and Investigation Center (Cisen), and Sedena estimate that the 15-20 smuggling groups operating in Sonora smuggle an average of 840,000 people a year netting nearly \$1.3 billion dollars a year.<sup>88</sup> The INM also estimates that 40% of all illegal immigrants pass through Sonora.<sup>89</sup> The attractiveness of Sonora as a smuggling point is due to increased Border Patrol operations in other states and the

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<sup>85</sup> Xochitl Alvarez, Marcelo Beyliss, Luigi Rivera, Angel Amador, Rosa Maria Mendez, Dinorath Mota, & Jaime Marquez. "Polleros, 'a Necessary Evil?," Mexico City El Universal. September 21, 2004. FBIS LAP20040921000046

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid

<sup>88</sup> "INM Estimates 70,000 Illegal Migrants Trafficked Per Month; 15-20 Organized 'Pollero' Groups Operating in Sonora State," *El Imparcial*. April 25, 2004. As found in "Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics," FBIS Report LAP20040426000058.

<sup>89</sup> "INM Affirms 'Number of Illegal Migrants Increasing,'" *El Imparcial*. May 13, 2004. As found in "Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics," FBIS Report. LAP20040513000072.

350-mile border shared with Arizona. Along this border are six major ports of entry: Agua Prieta/Douglas, Naco/Naco, Nogales/Nogales, Sasabe/Sasabe, Sonoyta/Lukeville, and San Luis Colorado. In between these towns lies a desert that contains only a three-strand barbed wire fence delineating the U.S.-Mexico border, except in limited areas.

A review of Mexican newspapers from 2003-2005 indicates that each of the major ports of entry has smuggling operations present. In addition, there are several unmanned “B” crossings, which while closed, continue to be used to cross the border. However, in terms of the number incidents reported in the Mexican media, two major areas for smuggling stand out. The first is a triangular area extending west from Agua Prieta through Naco to Nogales down southeast to Cananea and northeast back to Agua Prieta. (See map below). Within this area, Nogales appears to be the staging area for operations while Naco and Agua Prieta act as transit points for entry into the United States. The Mexican Consul in Douglas, Arizona, Miguel Escobar Valdez, reported that the Douglas, Arizona-Naco, Sonora area is the most used pathway for illegal migrants to cross into the United States.

<sup>90</sup> However, the presence of greater law enforcement in this area and lack of federal agency cooperation to patrol other areas of Arizona effectively is beginning to change this.

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<sup>90</sup> “Mexican Consul in Douglas, Arizona Asks for Help in Fighting ‘Coyotes,’” *El Imparcial*. April 30, 2004.

### *The Smuggling Triangle*

In Nogales, there are five known meeting points for migrants to hire smugglers. These include in front of the Ignacio Zaragoza school, Jarocho Hotel,<sup>91</sup> *Los Tapiros* neighborhood,<sup>92</sup> *Buenos Aires* neighborhood,<sup>93</sup> and the *Las Torres* neighborhood.<sup>94</sup> There are likely also several other meeting points used by non-Nogales based smuggling groups, which use Nogales as a stash site until transit to another location within Sonora or to another border state.



Three neighborhoods appear frequently in Mexican newspapers as being locations for smuggling operations. The *Los Tapiros* neighborhood was the site of operations for a smuggling gang that Antonio Castillo Valenzuela and Rey Borbon Cazares joined. According to statements after their arrest, their smuggling operation charged \$1,200 an alien to enter the United States.<sup>95</sup> Cristobal Ramon Palafox Martinez, alias “El Manotas,” operates out of the *El Cerro Pelon* area in the *Buenos Aires* neighborhood.<sup>96</sup> His gang also includes smugglers Daniel Felizardo Palafox Corral, alias “El Kirina,” Carlos Adrian Aguirre, and Rafael Peinado Romero.<sup>97</sup> In the *Las Torres* neighborhood, Adolfo Sanchez Valenzuela, alias “El Colisco,” and Pedro Israel Vega, “El Mono” Barrera operate smuggling businesses.<sup>98</sup> Finally, “El Mariposa,” a violent smuggling ring, which includes

<sup>91</sup>The Jarocho Hotel is alleged to stash migrants and assist a smuggler named “Mary.” According to the Mexican press, “Mary” charges \$1,500 per a migrant and pays her coyotes \$100 per a migrant. “El Diario Exposes Human-Trafficking Hotel,” *El Diario de la Frontera*. July 6, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20040706000067

<sup>92</sup> “Municipal Police Arrest Dangerous Alien-Trafficking Group,” *El Diario de la Frontera*. April 5, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP2004406000010

<sup>93</sup> “Alien Smugglers Escape Through Loopholes in System,” *El Diario de la Frontera*. March 27, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20040329000083

<sup>94</sup> “Municipal Police Capture Three Alien Smugglers, 37 Illegal Aliens,” *El Imparcial*. April 16, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20040416000079

<sup>95</sup> Ibid

<sup>96</sup> “Alien Smugglers Escape Through Loopholes in System,” *El Diario de la Frontera*. March 27, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20040329000083

<sup>97</sup> Ibid

<sup>98</sup> Ibid; “Municipal Police Capture Three Alien Smugglers, 37 Illegal Aliens,” *El Imparcial*. April 16, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20040416000079

family members, operates in Nogales; however, Mexican newspapers did not report the neighborhood they control.<sup>99</sup>

Cananea municipality has also been known as a place for migrants to meet human smugglers and as a transit point before proceeding to the border. In a well-known case, Mexican law enforcement authorities apprehended a group of Central Americans traveling by bus to Cananea municipality.<sup>100</sup> The Central Americans admitted to paying a smuggler named “Fidel” \$1,800 each and were told to meet him at the *La Huerta* hotel in Cananea municipality.<sup>101</sup> From *La Huerta*, Fidel promised to smuggle them to different parts of the United States.<sup>102</sup> Agua Prieta and Naco are also common transit points for migrants to cross the border and areas where human smugglers are known to operate. The Border Patrol has made its priority to patrol populated areas such as Nogales, Naco, and Douglas/Agua Prieta. However, they lack the resources to effectively patrol all of these areas at the same time.<sup>103</sup> Nonetheless, the Border Patrol has diverted some human smuggling away to more remote areas. One such route is originates from the Altar-Caborca area.

#### *Altar- Sasabe Route*

The area between Altar and Caborca has grown in recent years to become a second major route for human smugglers. In Altar, Mexican law enforcement agencies estimate that seven organized groups linked with taxi drivers, restaurants, tour guides and other local businesses operate a lucrative business.<sup>104</sup> According to these agencies’ estimates, these smuggling groups charge \$1,000 for each of the 1,500 migrants they are estimated to smuggle across the border daily, translating into \$1.5 million dollars a day. The most important operators among the seven groups include “Los Dominguez” and “Los Martinez.”<sup>105</sup> In addition to Mexican smuggling gangs operating, Mexican law enforcement authorities have found Brazilian run operations specializing in smuggling Brazilians.<sup>106</sup>

The preferred smuggling route is to transport aliens from Nogales to Altar then to Sasabe to cross the border.<sup>107</sup> Many times human smugglers use lands north of Sasabe—the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge—or west like the Tohono O’odham Reservation. Because these areas are remote and not likely to be patrolled, they have become popular

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<sup>99</sup> “Police Arrest Drug Trafficker, Alien Smuggler,” *El Diario de la Frontera*. March 6, 2005. As found in “Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20050822000052

<sup>100</sup> “Sonora State PFP Detains 42 Illegal Migrants,” *El Imparcial*. April 4, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP2004406000010

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>103</sup> “Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their Strategies and Operations on Federal Lands,” The United States General Accounting Office. June 2004. GAO-04-590

<sup>104</sup> “Alien Smuggling Groups Collect More Than \$1.5 Million Daily,” *El Diario de la Frontera*. June 2, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20040602000090.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>106</sup> “PFP Dismantles ‘Pollero’ Gang in Sonora,” *La Jornada*. June 1, 2004

<sup>107</sup> “Alien Smuggling Groups Collect More Than \$1.5 Million Daily,” *El Diario de la Frontera*. June 2, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20040602000090.

and rather dangerous areas to traverse for human smugglers and migrants. On the Tohono O’odham Reservation, migrants on foot must cross roughly 50 miles before reaching the first road.<sup>108</sup> In addition to the thousands of cars abandoned on these tribal lands, the Tohono O’odham Police Department estimates that nearly 1,500 illegal aliens cross into their lands each day.<sup>109</sup> A successful trek across the desert later leads to the smugglers transporting the aliens to Tucson and other destinations in the United States.<sup>110</sup>

### *Caborca to Sonoyta*

In Caborca, a new smuggling route has opened up in the rural areas of Caborca and Sonoyta. The route runs through several farming cooperatives, starting at the *Ultimo Esfuerzo* farming cooperative, running through *Juan Alavarez* farming cooperative, and ending at either the *La Division* farming cooperative of Caborca or the *La Nariz* farming cooperative in Sonoyta.<sup>111</sup> This new route has the benefit of being isolated and not patrolled by Mexican law enforcement. Likewise, the area across the U.S.-Mexican border— Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument—is also isolated. *Sonoyta* public officials have downplayed the extent of human smuggling present in the area. However, apprehensions of smugglers and UDAs have been reported on both sides of the border, indicating that the area is used by smugglers. The National Defense Secretariat (Sedena) apprehended 46 Brazillians at the *La Nariz* farming cooperative,<sup>112</sup> while police have detained smugglers in other incidents around Caborca.<sup>113</sup> Overall, apprehension of human smugglers in the area by Mexican law enforcement authorities has been limited compared to other areas of Sonora. This is surprising considering that the U.S. Park Service estimated in 2001 that 200,000 illegal aliens had entered the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument to use the 50 miles of smuggling paths present.<sup>114</sup> Moreover, Sonoyta’s proximity to Tohono O’odham Indian Reservation also suggests that human smugglers might use Sonoyta to enter Tohono O’odham as an entry point into Arizona.

### *San Luis-Sonoyta*

San Luis is also another drop off point for human smuggling. However, the Mexican media has mentioned only a few cases involving human smuggling in San Luis. In general, San Luis seems to be an area for drug operations rather than human smuggling. Human smuggling cases mentioned in the Mexican media include a naturalized American citizen from Armenia bribing law enforcement officials to allow him to deliver illegal

<sup>108</sup> “United States-Mexico barrier,” Wikipedia. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_States\\_Mexico\\_barrier](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Mexico_barrier)

<sup>109</sup> “Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their Strategies and Operations on Federal Lands,” The United States General Accounting Office. June 2004. GAO-04-590 pg. 13

<sup>110</sup> “Alien Smuggling Groups Collect More Than \$1.5 Million Daily,” *El Diario de la Frontera*. June 2, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20040602000090.

<sup>111</sup> “Human Traffickers Open New Route in Sonora State,” *El Imparcial*. March 28, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20040324000105

<sup>112</sup> “46 Illegal Immigrants Detained in Sonoyta, Sonora State,” *El Imparcial*. March 30, 2004. . As found in “Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20040324000105

<sup>113</sup> “Police Detain Six Illegal Migrants, Two Human Traffickers in Caborca, Sonora State,” *El Imparcial*. April 23, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20040423000099

<sup>114</sup> “Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their Strategies and Operations on Federal Lands,” The United States General Accounting Office. June 2004. GAO-04-590 pg. 13;

migrants to San Luis Rio Colorado<sup>115</sup> and the discovery of migrants stash houses during drug raids.<sup>116</sup> In one such raid, apprehended illegal migrants admitted to paying \$1,500 each to be smuggled to Los Angeles. East of San Luis lies Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge—Department of the Interior managed lands—and Department of Defense training grounds. Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Range currently has only three law enforcement officials patrolling 860,000 acres and the 200 miles of illegal roads made by human and drug smugglers.<sup>117</sup> Estimates on the number of UDA attempting to enter the United States through Cabeza Prieta each year range from 52,000<sup>118</sup> to as high as 365,000.<sup>119</sup> Meanwhile, the Marine Corp Air Station in Yuma, Arizona reported apprehending 1,500 UDAs in 2004 and 1,100 during the first three months of 2005.<sup>120</sup>

### *Pricing and Common Smuggling Methods*

The price for smuggling a migrant across the border ranges from \$650 to upwards of \$2,000 with the average price being \$1,700. The price depends on the organization, the types of services provided, and the city of origin of the migrant.<sup>121</sup> For example, an uncovered INM smuggling ring with operations in Sonora provided false documentation, lodging, transportation within Mexico and to the United States for prices ranging between \$2,000~\$3,000 an individual.<sup>122</sup> The methods used to smuggle migrants include taxis<sup>123</sup>, tractor trailers<sup>124</sup>, commuter busses, pick-up trucks<sup>125</sup>, sport utility vehicles, and false documents<sup>126</sup>. However, smugglers are beginning to use taxis in response to greater

<sup>115</sup> “INM Detains Six Illegal European Migrants, ‘Pollero’ in Sonora State,” *El Imparcial*. April 15, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20040415000081

<sup>116</sup> “Federal Officers Arrest Four Drug Traffickers, One Alien Smuggler in Separate Operations,” *El Imparcial*. April 16, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20040416000079

<sup>117</sup> “Transforming the Southern Border: Providing Security and Prosperity in the Post-9/11 World,” Congressman Jim Turner. September 10, 2004. <http://hsc-democrats.house.gov/HS/Issues/Border+Security.htm>

<sup>118</sup> Ibid

<sup>119</sup> “Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their Strategies and Operations on Federal Lands,” The United States General Accounting Office. June 2004. GAO-04-590 pg. 13

<sup>120</sup> Karen Schaler, “Border Crossings Hinder Training at Arizona Bases,” *The Boston Globe*. April 7, 2005

<sup>121</sup> For example, “El Colisco” charges between \$650~\$2,000 depending on the city of origin. “Municipal Police Capture Three Alien Smugglers, 37 Illegal Aliens,” *El Imparcial*. April 16, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20040416000079

<sup>122</sup> “Mexican Government Dismantles Major Human-Trafficking Network Out of INM Offices,” *El Universal*. March 24, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20040324000105

<sup>123</sup> “Police Arrest Three Alien Smugglers, Illegal Aliens in Separate Operations,” *El Imparcial*. April 21, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20040421000083

<sup>124</sup> “Border Patrol Captures 41 in Nogales, Sonora State,” *El Imparcial*. March 25, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20040325000028.

<sup>125</sup> “Nine Alleged Human Traffickers to Stand Trial,” The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR) Homepage. June 5, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20040607000081.

<sup>126</sup> The U.S. Consulate reported that 10,794 have been reported lost, stolen, or missing since 2000. It is suspected that human smugglers use these to smuggle migrants into the United States. “Ten Thousand Laser Visas Stolen, Lost, or Sold Since 2000 in Sonora State,” *El Imparcial*. April 28, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20040428000101

interdiction of migrants on commuter busses.<sup>127</sup> The smuggling ring typically outsources its services to other individuals at a price of \$100 a migrant<sup>128</sup> or hires taxi cab drivers to transport aliens to the Nogales outskirts for as little as \$10 a migrant.<sup>129</sup> One large Sonoran operation run by Yolanda Alvarez, alias “La Guera Pollera,” (the blond migrant trafficker) employed a method where illegal migrants met at predetermined locations on the border. From there, she transported illegal migrants in groups of 10 by pick-up truck across the border.<sup>130</sup>


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<sup>127</sup> “INM Detains 27 Illegal Migrants in Sonora State,” *El Imparcial*. June 7, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20040607000081.

<sup>128</sup> “Alien Smugglers Escape Through Loopholes in System,” *El Diario de la Frontera*. March 27, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20040329000083; “El Diario Exposes Human-Trafficking Hotel,” *El Diario de la Frontera*. July 6, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20040706000067

<sup>129</sup> “Police Arrest Three Alien Smugglers, Illegal Aliens in Separate Operations,” *El Imparcial*. April 21, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20040421000083

<sup>130</sup> “Nine Alleged Human Traffickers to Stand Trial,” The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR) Homepage. June 5, 2004. As found in “Highlights: Mexico, Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report LAP20040607000081.



Source: GAO. UDA Estimates from "Transforming the Southern Border: Promoting Security and Prosperity in the Post-9/11 World," and The Boston Globe.

### Baja California Norte

Under the "prevention through deterrence" program, U.S. Border Patrol agents have stepped up their efforts to shut down smuggling routes around San Diego. This has made Baja California a very difficult corridor to smuggle illegal migrants. On the face of it, INM statistics seem to support the difficulty of operating in Baja California. In 2003, the Mexican agency reported in 2003 that Baja California occupied the smallest percentage of nationwide apprehensions.<sup>131</sup> However, Mexican media sources have recorded the existence of several organized groups in Baja California. Some possible explanations for this paradox are that local police forces are extremely corrupt or Baja California groups, especially in the Mexicali area, are using Sonora as a smuggling corridor. The latter explanation seems the most likely considering Mexicali's close proximity to Sonora and desolate areas in Arizona.

<sup>131</sup>"Number of Illegal Migrant Arrests Doubled in Two Years," *El Universal*. April 18, 2004. LAP20040419000080

Three smuggling rings are known to control the smuggling route along Vieja Highway to Mexicali. The first group, *Puente Quemado*, is a group of three families working together: “Napo,” Jose, and Victor Mendez, “Tito,” and Jesus Mendez, and the Loreda family.<sup>132</sup> This group operates along a stretch of highway from Morelos St. to San Luis Highway.<sup>133</sup> The second group, known as *Colonia Del Rio*, is run by Miguel Ayala also known as “El Mike.”<sup>134</sup> A third group, *Los Wonders*, is also operating in the area but is not as involved in smuggling operations.<sup>135</sup>

Mexican media sources also point to two international smuggling rings that operated in Mexicali. One group, known as “El Morado,”<sup>136</sup> lost one of its leaders, Reynaldo Dorador Arangure, also known as “El Rey,” to arrest during a smuggling operation in 2004 that charged migrants \$1,500 each.<sup>137</sup> However, the Office of the Attorney General has also reported that in 2003 upon his first arrest that he charged upwards of \$6,000 to \$10,000 an illegal migrant.<sup>138</sup> “El Rey” is said to have contacts in the United States, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Ecuador.<sup>139</sup> Using these contacts, “El Rey” has smuggled Central Americans through Tapachula, Chiapas to Michoacan, then to Guadalajara where they were flown to the center of his operations in Baja California.<sup>140</sup> This year AFI officers also arrested another leader of an international smuggling group. Arturo Garcia Lizarraga, alias “El Gringo,” was the alleged leader of an international human-trafficking gang that operates from Central America to Mexicali.<sup>141</sup> The existence of so many well known groups to the media suggests that operations in Baja California are consolidated and highly criminalized.

### *Smuggling Routes and Methods*

Mexican media sources have not reported on the routes smuggling groups in Baja California used to enter the United States. There is indication that groups operating in Mexicali travel to isolated areas outside of Mexicali or into Sonora to smuggle illegal migrants. In addition, PFP officers have discovered tunnels in Tijuana they believe are

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<sup>132</sup> “Two Alien-Smuggling Groups Identified,” *El Imparcial* April 25, 2004 FBIS Text LAP20040426000058

<sup>133</sup> Ibid

<sup>134</sup> Ibid

<sup>135</sup> “Two Alien-Smuggling Groups Identified,” *El Imparcial*. April 25, 2004 FBIS Text LAP20040426000058; “Municipal Police Apprehend ‘Pollero,’” *La Frontera*. July 27, 2005. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime and Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20050727000071

<sup>136</sup> “Bulletin 277/04: Judge Indicts, Orders Alien Smugglers To Stand Trial,” The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR) website. March 17, 2004. LAP20040317000106 Mexico -- FBIS Report in Spanish 17 Mar 04

<sup>137</sup> “PEP Captures International Group of Alien Smugglers,” *La Cronica*. March 8, 2004. FBIS LAP20040308000096

<sup>138</sup> “International ‘Pollero’ Leader Captured in Mexicali,” *Cuarto Poder* August 3, 2003. FBIS LAP20030804000078

<sup>139</sup> “PEP Captures International Group of Alien Smugglers,” *La Cronica*. March 8, 2004. FBIS LAP20040308000096

<sup>140</sup> Ibid

<sup>141</sup> “AFI Arrests Alleged Human-Trafficking Leader,” *La Cronica*. July 30, 2005. As found in “Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics,” FBIS Report. LAP20050801000047

used for smuggling illegal migrants.<sup>142</sup> Unique to Baja California is the growth in the number of smuggled children and use of children as smugglers.<sup>143</sup> The Mexican Consul in Calexico, California, Pablo Jesus Arnaud Carreno, warned that gangs of juvenile human smugglers, between the ages of 15 and 17, have proliferated along the 76 miles of border between Mexicali and Calexico.<sup>144</sup> The primary reason for using minors to smuggle migrants across the border is because they are immediately deported when apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol.<sup>145</sup>

### Chiapas

Estimates on the number of illegal migrants entering Mexico vary from an estimated 1 million<sup>146</sup> to 2.83 million.<sup>147</sup> Due to the instability and the 700-km shared border with Guatemala, Chiapas State has become a major entry point for these people to enter into Mexico. It is now estimated 95% illegal aliens entering into Mexico do so through one of the unofficial 31 crossings in Chiapas.<sup>148</sup> Human smugglers in Chiapas have taken advantage of the porous border netting an estimated \$1.5 billion every year.<sup>149</sup>

Although there are 31 unofficial crossings along the Guatemalan-Mexican border, most illegal migrants begin their entry into Mexico at the Guatemalan border town Tecun Uman located 100 meters from Ciudad Hidalgo in Chiapas, Mexico. At this border town, the Suchiate River demarcates the Guatemalan-Mexican border allowing easy access into Mexico. The Los Angeles Times reported that a stretch of this river a quarter-mile east of the official crossing has a flotilla of rafts transporting illegal aliens, day laborers, and shoppers for a 50-cent fare.<sup>150</sup> It also noted that others may simply wade across the 100-foot wide river.<sup>151</sup>

### Railroad Route

Once across the river, illegal aliens make one of several ways to the northern border. One such way is to reach the Chiapas-Mayab railroad yard in Ciudad Hidalgo to walk along the train tracks or to board trains for the ride north to the United States. This can be an effective way to traverse Mexico since the railroad route travels through Chiapas, Oaxaca, Veracruz, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatan, and Quintana Roo. Since most illegal

<sup>142</sup> "Authorities Discover Tunnel Near Tijuana Customs Office," *La Frontera*. July 3, 2004. FBIS LAP20040706000067.

<sup>143</sup> "Police Capture 3 Alleged 'Polleros,' 3 Underage Migrants," *La Frontera*. August 2, 2005. As found in Highlights: Mexico Crime and Narcotics," FBIS Report. LAP20050802000078

<sup>144</sup> "Mexican Consul Notes Proliferation of 'Child Polleros,'" *El Universal*. August 17, 2005. As found in "Highlights: Mexico Crime, Narcotics," FBIS Report. LAP20050817000091

<sup>145</sup> "Aumentan Los Menores Polleros," *Diarios Rumbo*. August 30, 2005 (Spanish)

<sup>146</sup> "450 Mil Inmigrantes Se Establecerán Aquí," *Cuarto Poder*. July 1, 2005. (Spanish)

<sup>147</sup> "Illegal-Alien Trafficking on Southern Border Nets \$1.5 Billion Annually," *Cuarto Poder*. March 30, 2004. FBIS LAP20040330000092

<sup>148</sup> "Mexico: Mara Salvatrucha Head Says Group Seeks to Control Alien Smuggling," *Milenio Semanal* March 27, 2005. FBIS LAP20050405000020; "Illegal-Alien Trafficking on Southern Border Nets \$1.5 Billion Annually," *Cuarto Poder* March 30, 2004. FBIS LAP20040330000092

<sup>149</sup> "Illegal-Alien Trafficking on Southern Border Nets \$1.5 Billion Annually," *Cuarto Poder* March 30, 2004. FBIS LAP20040330000092

<sup>150</sup> Chris Kraul. "A Surge South of Mexico," *The Los Angeles Times*. May 1, 2005.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid*

migrants are entering through Chiapas, it is logical to assume that illegal migrants are alighting from trains in Oaxaca, Veracruz, and possibly Tabasco. A 2002 study by the Mexican National Action Party (PAN) revealed that the INM, State and Federal Police, and the Chiapas-Mayab engine drivers were involved in the “railroad route.”<sup>152</sup> According to an interviewed human smuggler, engine drivers receive \$1,400 while law enforcement authorities receive almost \$100.<sup>153</sup>



Illegal migrants on the Chiapas-Mayab railroad usually encounter the Mara Salvatrucha-13<sup>154</sup> (MS) or Barrio-18 gangs, which have battled for control of the smuggling business on the Chiapas-Mayab railroad and at the Suchiate River.<sup>155</sup> MS is well-known for its

<sup>152</sup> María de los Angeles Nivon. “Mexico: Smuggling of Illegal Aliens Said Thriving in Oaxaca,” *El Imparcial*. February 22, 2002. FBIS LAP20020220000022

<sup>153</sup> Maria De Jesus Peters, “Extorsionan Maras a Ilegales,” *El Universal*. September 3, 2005.

<<http://estadis.eluniversal.com.mx/>>

<sup>154</sup> Mara Salvatrucha (MS) is a violent street gang operating nationwide and estimated to have 10,000 members. MS was born out of Salvadorian refugees with roots to a street gang known as La Mara in El Salvador and paramilitary groups like the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL). Al Valdez, Investigator Orange County District Attorney's Office, “A South American Import” National Alliance Gang Investigators Associations (NAIGA) <[http://www.naiga.org/mara\\_salvatrucha.htm](http://www.naiga.org/mara_salvatrucha.htm)>

<sup>155</sup> Mexico: Mara Salvatrucha Head Says Group Seeks to Control Alien Smuggling,” *Milenio Seminal* March 27, 2005. FBIS LAP20050405000020

sophistication, maintaining active ties with gangs in El Salvador, and arms smuggling networks. U.S. deported MS members have flourished along the Mexican-Guatemalan border in the state of Chiapas, where they have established a smuggling operation for persons, drugs, and weapons. MS has used the cargo railroad which departs from the border city of *Tapachula* to transport its smuggled cargo to northern Mexico.<sup>156</sup> MS also has a lucrative business involving exports of stolen automobiles and money laundering. Some have also implicated the gang in the coercion of smuggled aliens into their criminal enterprises.<sup>157</sup>

Other human smugglers have had to handover their illegal migrants to MS to be transported to Oaxaca. These human smugglers then pick up their clients in Oaxaca and continue their work. (As such, some human smugglers have begun to relocate their operations to the Chiapas highlands where they rely on federal highways to transport aliens.) MS charges different fees for protection and transportation to Ixtepec, Oaxaca. Typically, the fee is between \$100 to \$500 except for Asians, Romanians, and Arabs, who must pay up to \$2000.<sup>158</sup> MS take the transportation and protection of UDAs very seriously. According to a *Mexico City Milenio Semanal* article, MS members transporting UDAs are forbidden to consume alcohol or drugs. For groups of UDAs greater than 30, MS will transport them in boxed cars and guard them with two gang leaders and 30 or more MS members.<sup>159</sup>

Using the “railroad route” has become expensive and extremely dangerous for illegal migrants. Many illegal migrants who fail to pay MS or Barrio-18 are attacked while others may die from walking along the railroad tracks or asphyxiation from being trapped in sealed boxcars. Additionally, the possibility of apprehension has become much higher since the inception of Operation Acero and Operation Acero II. These interagency plans which coordinate efforts between the Mixed Operations Base (BOM), the State Investigative Agency (AEI), and the National Migration Institute (INM), have focused on apprehending Mara Salvatrucha and illegal migrants, both of whom are known to frequent the Chiapas-Mayab railway.<sup>160</sup> Typical areas of apprehension include locations such as at the Chiapas-Mayab railroad company in Tuxtla Gutierrez, Los Torros, La Bombilla, and Huixtla train stations.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> Carlos Mauricio Pineda Cruz, “Al-Qaeda’s Unlikely Allies in Central America.” The Jamestown Foundation. Volume 3, Issue 1 January 13, 2005

<sup>157</sup> Daniel B. Wood, “Raids Mark a Gain in War on Gangs.” Christian Science Monitor. March 18, 2005 <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0318/p03s02-usju.html>; Michelle Malkin “Gang Land.” Americans for Legal Immigration (ALI). March 2, 2005. <http://www.alipac.us/article242.html> ; Susan Carroll, “Violent Gang Using Arizona as Gateway--Officials: Members Just Passing Through.” AZCentral.Com May. 8, 2005

<sup>158</sup> Mexico: Mara Salvatrucha Head Says Group Seeks to Control Alien Smuggling,” *Milenio Semanal* March 27, 2005. FBIS LAP20050405000020

<sup>159</sup> Ibid

<sup>160</sup> “72 Undocumented Central Americans Arrested in ‘Acero’ Operation,” *Diario de Chiapas*. March 17, 2004. FBIS LAP20040317000106

<sup>161</sup> “State Police Launch ‘Operation Acero II,’ Arrest 158 Undocumented Central Americans,” *Diario de Chiapas*. March 29, 2004. FBIS 20040329000083; “Joint Operation Launched To Rescue 27 Undocumented Central Americans Sealed Inside Train Car,” *Diario de Chiapas*. April 22, 2004. FBIS

### *Other Smuggling Routes and Methods*

The difficulties of using the Chiapas-Mayab railroad have pushed many illegal migrants to employ human smugglers to transport them. Arriving in such towns as Ciudad Hidalgo, illegal migrants will contract with a *pollero*. The *pollero* has an established network in place that includes *pollero guia* (smuggler guide), *lonchero fiyo* (food vendor), and sometimes taxi drivers.<sup>162</sup> Depending on the operation, illegal migrants will receive fraudulent documents such as Mexican voter registration cards or will be stashed into large trucks among other goods. In a review of 105 reported apprehension cases over the last two years, a majority of illegal migrants have been found stashed in tractor-trailers, large trucks, busses, and automobiles. This dependence on ground transportation and the limited infrastructure in Chiapas means that human smugglers must use major roadways to reach other Mexican states.

From Ciudad Hidalgo, smugglers and illegal migrants must pass through the city of Tapachula. From Tapachula, smugglers have a choice of using Mexican Federal Highway 200 or Mexican Federal Highway 211. Mexican Federal Highway 200 runs along the coast of the Gulf of Tehuantepec and the Chiapas-Mayab railroad to Oaxaca. However, the most common roadway—nearly 75% of those cases mentioned in the media—is Mexican Federal Highway 190.<sup>163</sup> Human smugglers, therefore, use Mexican Federal Highway 211, which connects with Mexican Federal Highway 190 in Ciudad Cuauhtemoc near the Guatemalan border.<sup>164</sup> Mexican Federal Highway 190 runs through Chiapas' major cities including Comitán de Domínguez, San Cristóbal de las Casas, and Tuxtla Gutiérrez. Using this route, human smugglers can connect with other Mexican Federal Highways to go to different states. Given the number of apprehensions in Tabasco, it seems that human smugglers are using Federal Highway 195 to Villahermosa, Tabasco, Federal Highway 199 from San Cristóbal de las Casas to Palenque, Chiapas and to Villahermosa, Tabasco. It is also more likely that illegal migrants apprehended in Tabasco are either smuggled by car from Chiapas or entering Tabasco from the Guatemalan border. It is doubtful that they are riding the Chiapas-Mayab railway from Chiapas to Tabasco since this would take them on a southerly route.

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LAP20040422000088; "BOM Apprehends 183 Undocumented Migrants in Chiapas," *El Universal*. May 13, 2004. FBIS LAP20040513000072

<sup>162</sup> María de los Angeles Nivón. "Mexico: Smuggling of Illegal Aliens Said Thriving in Oaxaca," *El Imparcial*. February 22, 2002. FBIS LAP20020220000022

<sup>163</sup> "PFP Arrests 'Pollero,' Undocumented Honduran Crossing Chiapas-Guatemala Border," *Cuarto Poder*. August 21, 2004.

<sup>164</sup> Illegal immigrants could enter into Mexico through Ciudad Cuauhtemoc and use smugglers to be transported along Federal Highway 190. However, a review of Mexican media sources does not indicate that this occurring.



### *Smuggling Fees*

The prices charged in Chiapas vary according to the nationality of the illegal migrant and the means of transportation. Smugglers charge between \$1,000 to \$2,000 for Central Americans and up to \$35,000 for illegal migrants from Asia, India, and the Middle East.<sup>165</sup> Mexican media sources also indicate that smugglers who use busses and tractor trailers charged the least amount. Apprehended smugglers using busses and tractor-trailers have charged as little as \$200 to \$1,000 per an illegal migrant.<sup>166</sup>

<sup>165</sup> "Illegal Alien Trafficking on Southern Border Nets \$1.5 Billion Annually," *Cuarto Poder*. March 30, 2004. FBIS LAP 20040330000092

<sup>166</sup> "SEDENA Intercepts 226 Undocumented Central Americans," *Liberal del Sur*. March 1, 2005. FBIS LAP20050301000102; "PFP Detains 2 'Polleros,' 9 Illegal Migrants," *Diario de Chiapas* July 28, 2005 LAP20050728000050

## Veracruz

Veracruz, the 11<sup>th</sup> largest state in Mexico, borders the Gulf of Mexico to the East, Tamaulipas to the north, Puebla, Hidalgo, and San Luis Potosi to the west, Oaxaca and Chiapas to the south, and Tabasco to the southeast. Veracruz has become an important transit point for illegal migrants primarily because it offers the shortest route to the U.S.-Mexican border in Tamaulipas. Veracruz authorities have noticed a 120% increase during the first six months of 2005 as compared to the same period in 2004.<sup>167</sup> In 2003, apprehensions of illegal migrants in Veracruz represented 8.7% of all apprehensions.<sup>168</sup>

### *Smuggling Groups*

Unlike in states such as Sonora, Baja California, and Chiapas, Mexican media resources have not reported on the names of groups or individuals involved in human smuggling. In the cases reviewed, there were only a few, albeit large, smuggling operations based in Veracruz. In Tihuatlan, a married couple ran an international smuggling operation. The couple established routes that began in Central America and ended in Florida. The couple charged each migrant \$2,500 to stay in a stash house before being smuggled to Verobeach or Miami, Florida.<sup>169</sup> Another Tihuatlan couple, Filberto Alvarado and Neli Ramirez Raubro were arrested along with several others for operating a stash house—charging 50-100 pesos daily—and a smuggling network.<sup>170</sup> They came under suspicion after making several phone calls to Honduras, Guatemala, and Atlanta, Georgia from their farming cooperative based home. The final case involved Mexican civil servants. The leader of the ring, Bernal Mendez Serrano, was indicted for an international smuggling operation. The Mendez Serrano ring recruited illegal migrants in Honduras, Guatemala, Brazil, and El Salvador.<sup>171</sup> The Mendez Serrano ring moved illegal migrants from Mexico City to Ciudad Juarez then into the United States.<sup>172</sup>

### *Smuggling Routes*

A review of reported apprehensions in the Mexican media seems to indicate that Puerto de Veracruz plays an important transit point for illegal migrants and human smugglers. Many apprehended illegal migrants state that they traveled through Puerto de Veracruz on their way to Puebla.<sup>173</sup> (Puebla also seems like a common destination for Central Americans.) This could be because of the road layout in Mexico. For example,

<sup>167</sup> “Veracruz SSP Discloses 2005 Figures on Illegal Migrant, Human Smuggler Arrests,” *La Opinion*. July 27, 2005. FBIS LAP20050727000071

<sup>168</sup> “Number of Illegal Migrant Arrests Doubled in Two Years,” *El Universal*. April 18, 2004. FBIS LAP20040419000080

<sup>169</sup> “Arrest of ‘Pollero’ Couple Leads to Discovery of Extensive Human-Trafficking Ring,” *La Opinion*. June 28, 2005. FBIS LAP20050628000054

<sup>170</sup> “AFI Captures ‘Pollero’ Ring; Detains Four Illegal Migrants,” *La Opinion*. May 8, 2004. FBIS LAP20040510000075.

<sup>171</sup> “Federal Judge in Veracruz State Indicts, Orders Alleged Head of Human Trafficking Ring to Stand Trial,” Office of the Attorney General website. Bulletin 325/04. FBIS LAP20040402000084

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>173</sup> “SEDENA Intercepts 226 Undocumented Central Americans,” *Liberal del Sur*. March 1, 2005. FBIS LAP20050301000102; “PFP Discover 92 Undocumented Persons Hidden in Secret Compartment of Trailer Traveling Through Veracruz State,” *El Liberal del Sur*. March 8, 2004. FBIS LAP20040308000096; “PFP Nab Military Officer Doubling as Alien Smuggler in Tabasco State,” *El Liberal del Sur*. March 18, 2004. FBIS LAP20040318000105.

apprehended illegal migrants have stated that they entered via Ciudad Hidalgo, traveled to Puerto de Veracruz, took a bus to Puebla with the intention of reaching Matamoros on the U.S.-Mexican border.<sup>174</sup> Another route Central Americans use to enter the United States via Mexico is through Oaxaca state or Tabasco state. In this case, the illegal migrants travel to Acayucan, Minatitlan, and Coatzacoalcos, and then head for Tierra Blanca, Cordoba.<sup>175</sup>

In numerous sources, Federal Highway 180 is mentioned as an apprehension point for human smugglers and illegal migrants.<sup>176</sup> Federal Highway 180 begins in Cancun, Quintana Roo, runs through Yucatan state, then along the coast through Campeche state into Tabasco and through to Veracruz and ultimately ends in Tamaulipas state. Federal Highway 180 also runs just north of the Chiapas-Tabasco border. Human smugglers could have entered onto the highway at any of these states. However, Quintana Roo and Yucatan are unlikely states for Central Americans to begin their journey. First, there are few illegal migrants from Belize attempting to enter Mexico via Quintana Roo to gain entry into the United States.<sup>177</sup> Second, Yucatan has the least amount of illegal migrant apprehensions in Mexico. This suggests that Yucatan is not a typical transit point for illegal migrants. Rather, illegal migrants entering Veracruz by Federal Highway 180 likely entered from Tabasco, Campeche, or Chiapas since these states share a border with Guatemala. Extrapolating from reported apprehensions listed in the Mexican media, human smugglers likely entered Federal Highway 180 in Tabasco just north of the state of Chiapas where 95% of illegal migrants are estimated to enter.

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<sup>174</sup> “Veracruz State Public Security Units Take Human Trafficker, 10 Illegal Aliens into Custody,” *La Opinion*. March 3, 2004. FBIS LAP20040303000127; “PFP Units Detain Five Undocumented Persons at Bus Station in Xicotepec de Juarez,” *La Opinion*. March 5, 2004. FBIS LAP20040305000111

<sup>175</sup> “SSP Says Over 2,500 Central Americans, 40 Alien Smugglers Apprehended So Far This Year,” *El Liberal del Sur*. March 29, 2004. FBIS LAP20040329000083

<sup>176</sup> “Highway Authorities Intercept Three Undocumented Hondurans,” *La Opinion*. June 15, 2004. FBIS LAP20040615000082; “SSP Detains Four Illegal Hondurans With False Documentation,” *La Opinion*. July 3, 2004. FBIS LAP20040706000067

<sup>177</sup> “INM Reports 400 Illegal Migrants Detained in Quintana Roo in 2004,” *Cancun Novedades de Quintana Roo*. March 21, 2004. FBIS LAP20040322000088

### *Human Smuggling Methods*

In some instances, human smugglers will hire drivers of tractor-trailers to smuggle illegal migrants. The truck driver receives minimum payments \$1,838 (20,000 pesos).<sup>178</sup> The human smugglers then drive ahead of the truck and communicate with the driver by telephone.<sup>179</sup> Just as in other states, other less sophisticated means transporting illegal aliens—commuter buses, trucks, automobiles—exist. In addition, illegal migrants use trains to move from Las Choapas on the Tabasco border and Coatzacoalcos to Cordoba, Orizaba, and Fortin de Las Flores on the Puebla border.<sup>180</sup>

### **Tabasco**

Tabasco comprises of a heavily rain forested coastal plain that borders the Gulf of Mexico to the north, Veracruz to the west, Chiapas to the south, Campeche to the north-east, and Guatemala to the south. Although it borders Guatemala, it appears not to attract as many illegal migrants from its border as Chiapas. Rather, Mexican media sources and INM apprehension statistics rank Tabasco low in the number of apprehensions at only 8.7%.<sup>181</sup> The INM admits that there has been an increase in the number of apprehensions—18% increase—between 2002 and 2003 in Tabasco. However, INM believes the increase is due to better coordinated efforts rather than an increase in the flow of illegal migrants into Tabasco.<sup>182</sup>

### *Smuggling Groups & Routes*

Despite several articles on human smuggling in other states, there are few regarding human smuggling in Tabasco. In fact, of the 30 human smuggling articles found in Tabasco state newspapers, 14 were about human smuggling in other states. This suggests that human smuggling is either rare or involves public officials who will not report about it. Indeed, this seems to be the case. Of the 13 human smuggling cases found in the media, five of these reported on indictments of public officials over human smuggling. Past incidents have included public officials from the military, Beta Sur, INM, and the police department.<sup>183</sup> One route reported to be possibly used by law enforcement authorities is along the Rio Grijalva better known as the Rio Grande as it passes through

<sup>178</sup> “DGSPE Intercepts Alien Smuggler, 121 Undocumented Central Americans,” *Liberal del Sur*. January 15, 2005. FBIS LAP20050216000098.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid; “Veracruz State SSP Detains Over 250 Undocumented Central Americans in Multiple Operations,” *La Opinion*. April 25, 2005. FBIS LAP20050425000051

<sup>180</sup> “Number of Undocumented Persons Apprehended Up 40 Percent From Last Year,” *La Opinion*. April 7, 2004. FBIS LAP20040407000088

<sup>181</sup> “Number of Illegal Migrant Arrests Doubled in Two Years,” *El Universal*. April 18, 2004. FBIS LAP20040419000080

<sup>182</sup> “Joint Efforts in Tabasco State Help Authorities Apprehend Around 18,000 Undocumented Persons in 2003,” *Villahermosa Presente*. March 10, 2004. FBIS LAP20040310000120.

<sup>183</sup> “PFP Nab Military Officer Doubling as Alien Smuggler in Tabasco State,” *El Liberal del Sur*. March 18, 2004. FBIS LAP20040318000105; “INM Agents Among 40 Arrested With Alleged Ties to Human-Trafficking Rings,” *Cuarto Poder*. March 23, 2004. FBIS LAP20040323000099; “Three Local Police Officers Dismissed On Charges of Exhorting Money From Undocumented Persons,” *Villahermosa Presente*. March 23, 2004. FBIS LAP20040323000099; “PGJE Takes Two Judicial Police Officers Into Custody When Found Transporting Seven Undocumented Central Americans,” *Tabasco Hoy*. March 26, 2004. FBIS LAP20040326000093; “Police Officers Accused of Human Trafficking,” *Villahermosa Presente*. August 3, 2004. FBIS LAP20040803000080

Chiapa de Corzo.<sup>184</sup> It is reported that migrants make the river trip with armed escorts at night. Law enforcement agencies have reportedly failed to patrol this area despite several protests by local residents.<sup>185</sup>

### **Campeche**

Campeche shares borders with Yucatan to the northeast, Quintana Roo to the east, Tabasco to the southwest, and Guatemala to the south. Its border with Guatemala is approximately 200 km long, but Campeche is not an important smuggling corridor into Mexico. In 2003, there were only 839 illegal migrants apprehended.<sup>186</sup> More likely the case, Campeche is a transit state for illegal migrants heading to other destinations in Mexico. Among its municipalities, Escarcega, Carmen, and Campeche are important apprehension and hence transit points for illegal migrants. In particular, Escarcega municipality ranked the highest with 68% of all apprehensions occurring there in 2003.<sup>187</sup>

#### *Smuggling Groups/Prices*

Campeche based newspapers did not report on human smuggling groups operating in this southern border state. Reports on human smuggling indicate that a majority of apprehensions occur at bus terminals and at road blocks along major highways. In addition, none of the apprehensions found in the Mexican media reported on the amount illegal migrants paid to human smugglers. Since a majority of human smuggling articles in other states typically record the smuggling fee, this may be another indication that illegal migrants travel through Campeche without the aid of human smugglers. However, it is a real possibility that illegal migrants are traveling to other states where human smugglers operate.

#### *Smuggling Routes*

INM 2003 statistics indicate that migration enforcement is occurring in only three municipalities: Campeche, Escarcega, and Carmen.<sup>188</sup> These three municipalities are ideal choke points along the major Federal Highways running through Campeche and contain large bus terminals.<sup>189</sup> Within Escarcega municipality, a majority of apprehended aliens were found in the cities of Escarcega and Candelaria. Escarcega's importance to illegal migrants is no doubt due to its proximity to the southern border and the role it plays as a hub for Federal Highways 261 and 186 and the Chiapas-Mayab railway.

#### *Smuggling Methods*

Some articles in Veracruz and Campeche newspapers reported on the use of tractor-trailers to smuggle illegal migrants.<sup>190</sup> In one incident, illegal migrants were found in the false bottom of a tractor trailer transporting glass from Escarcega to Puebla state.<sup>191</sup> However, commuter buses have featured the heaviest in media sources in Campeche. Illegal migrants have used buses that run between Tenosique in Tabasco through Candelaria and Escarcega to Campeche.<sup>192</sup> Some illegal aliens apprehended in Escarcega have stated that they were traveling to Campeche.<sup>193</sup> It is unclear whether these migrants

<sup>184</sup> "Rio Grijalva, 'Easy Passage' for Illegal Migrants Escorted by Armed Command," *Cuarto Poder*. July 26, 2005. FBIS LAP20040726000068.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid*

intended to travel to the U.S.-Mexican border since Campeche is further south and east of the closest U.S. entry point or to find employment in Campeche.

Nonetheless, the commuter bus system represents a cheap and efficient way of moving through Mexico especially within a southern border state like Campeche. From Escarcega, illegal migrants can pay roughly \$15 to travel by bus on Federal Highway 186 to the next large city, Villahermosa in Tabasco.<sup>194</sup> Likewise, they can pay \$7 to travel by bus on Federal Highways 261 and 180 to Campeche—the capital of the state.<sup>195</sup> Both Federal Highways 186 and 261 eventually connect with Federal Highway 180, which is an important artery for legitimate and illegitimate business.

### **Sinaloa**

Sinaloa borders several Mexican states including Sonora to the north, Chihuahua to the northeast, Durango to the east, and Nayarit to the south. To the west lies the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of California. Sinaloa has an extensive history of cultivating and distributing illegal narcotics. During World War II, Sinaloa was the site of opium cultivation for morphine supplies for the U.S. military. After the war, residents in Sinaloa began producing and smuggling heroin into the United States. In the 1980's, Sinaloa suppliers began smuggling cocaine for Columbian producers turning Sinaloa into the home for Mexico's most infamous drug traffickers.

Sinaloa's proximity to the U.S.-Mexican border and Sonora along with its history of smuggling into the United States makes it an ideal operating and transit site for human smugglers. Despite its geographic and historical advantage in smuggling, a review of Mexican media sources yields few articles on human smuggling operations and apprehensions of Mexican and illegal migrants. In addition, little was reported on the names of individuals and groups active in smuggling. This lack of media coverage may be due to the limited appeal to the local audience. After all, Sinaloa is known for its

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<sup>186</sup> "Campeche State INM Delegate Reports on Border Security Measures, Illegal Alien Arrests to Date," *El Sur de Campeche*. March 24, 2004. FBIS LAP20040324000105.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>188</sup> The INM reported that 68 percent the 2003 arrests occurred in the Escarcega municipality, 15 percent in Campeche, and 17 percent in Carmen. "Campeche State INM Delegate Reports on Border Security Measures, Illegal Alien Arrests to Date," *El Sur de Campeche*. March 24, 2004. FBIS LAP20040324000105.

<sup>189</sup> These Federal Highways include 180, 186, & 261.

<sup>190</sup> "Three Illegal Guatemalans Arrested on Carmen-Puerto Real Highway," *El Sue de Campeche*. March 25, 2004. FBIS 20040325000028

<sup>191</sup> "PFP Detains 69 Illegal Migrants, 'Pollero' in Veracruz State," *El Liberal del Sur*. May 8, 2004. FBIS LAP20040510000075.

<sup>192</sup> "INM Arrests Two Undocumented Hondurans at Bus Terminal," *El Sur de Campeche*. March 10, 2004. FBIS LAP20040308000096

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>194</sup> Ticket prices found on Ticketbus website. <<http://www.ticketbus.com.mx>>

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid*

backlash against Mexican federal efforts to crack down on drug trafficking and its respect for such famous malefactors as the mythical “Narco Saint,” Jesus Malverde.<sup>196</sup>

### *Smuggling Routes*

Federal Highway 15, running from Mexico City to Agua Prieta, Sonora, runs north and south through Sinaloa and connects with major cities throughout Sinaloa and well-known smuggling areas in Sonora.<sup>197</sup> Additionally, Federal Highway 15 also provides smugglers the chance to connect in southern Sinaloa with Federal Highway 40 and 45—highways running to Reynosa, Tamaulipas and Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua respectively. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the last two years, several apprehensions have occurred near Federal Highway 15. Apprehensions have occurred between Mazatlan and Culiacan in the southern Sinaloa,<sup>198</sup> northern Sinaloa, and southern Sonora indicate that smugglers are entering in the south and traveling north.<sup>199</sup>

### *Smuggling Methods/Smuggling Fees*

Due to the paucity of media reports and bias towards Central Americans, it is difficult to determine conclusively the fee in Sinaloa for transporting illegal migrants. Likewise, the choice of smuggling method is inconclusive. However, half of reported apprehensions mentioned the use of commuter buses.<sup>200</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Arizona has become a casualty in the federal government’s battle against illegal immigration from Mexico and Central America. With other entry points along the Southwest border essentially inaccessible, undocumented aliens have grown to rely on organized criminal organizations to assist them across the border. These organizations have become particularly active in Sonora where these organizations net over a billion dollars annually. The presence of these organizations entering Arizona has had a destabilizing

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<sup>196</sup> Jesus Malverde, or the “Angel of the Poor,” is said to have been a bandit that stole from rich and gave to the poor. However, the myth of Jesus Malverde became a cultural phenomenon in the 1970s when the Mexican military began a crackdown on drug smugglers. Today, common residents, farmers, and drug traffickers pay homage to the “Narco Saint” for miracles and in the case of drug traffickers, successful “runs” to the United States.

<sup>197</sup> As mentioned previously, there are several smuggling operations around the Nogales, Cananea, Naco, and Agua Prieta area. The geographic locations of these cities forms a triangular area based around Federal Highways 15 and 19.

<sup>198</sup> “INM Arrests 5 Illegal Guatemalan Migrants,” *El Debate*. July 6, 2005. FBIS LAP20050706000066; “One ‘Pollero,’ 15 Illegal Migrants Detained by PFP in Sinaloa State,” *La Cronica*. April 9, 2004. FBIS LAP20040409000057

<sup>199</sup> “PFP Arrests 22 Illegal Guatemalans in Sinaloa,” *El Debate*. August 20, 2005. FBIS LAP20050822000052.; “INM Detains 100 Illegal Migrants in Sonora State,” *El Imparcial*. April 17, 2004. FBIS LAP20040419000080.

<sup>200</sup> “PFP Arrests 22 Illegal Guatemalans in Sinaloa,” *El Debate*. August 20, 2005. FBIS LAP20050822000052; “INM Arrests 5 Illegal Guatemalan Migrants,” *El Debate*. July 6, 2005. FBIS LAP20050706000066; “AFI Federal Agents Arrest Two Men for Transporting Illegal Aliens,” The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR) website Bulletin 278/04. March 17, 2004. FBIS LAP20040317000106.; “INM Intercepts 17 Illegal Aliens,” *El Debate*. June 25, 2004. FBIS LAP20040625000053

effect upon local communities unable to cope with the increased rate of violent acts and secondary crimes.

Migratory experts would likely point to push and pull factors to explain the current migratory phenomenon. However, this approach excludes the criminal aspect of illegal immigration and other important factors at work in the decision to migration. These factors include the presence of relatives and family members, the expectation of a higher income in the United States, greater political and economic freedoms, and in some cases, the opportunity to escape family and social obligations and criminal prosecution. Since many of these factors lie outside of Arizona's regulatory scope, Arizona can only concentrate on the most critical elements necessary for human smuggling operations. These include transportation, stash houses, and most importantly, the repatriation of smuggling profits.

In tackling the repatriation of these smuggling profits, Arizona anti-money laundering efforts have concentrated on seizing funds suspected of being obtained illegally. Given the scale of money remitted into Arizona, an alternative approach may be to tax all money transferred to Arizona or limit the number of state licenses issued to money remitting agents. These would raise the cost of repatriating money for human smugglers. However, it should be noted that taxes are less market distorting and have the benefit of being a source of revenue for the state.

An alternative approach would be to increase the likelihood of apprehension and the punishment for human smuggling. The Arizona state legislature could increase the penalties of human smuggling to deter would be human smugglers. To effectively enforce this policy, the Department of Public Safety could increase patrols for human smugglers and undocumented aliens along major transportation arteries. However, this policy would require additional state money to build and house undocumented aliens until federal agents took custody of the apprehended undocumented aliens.

Since illegal immigration remains such a divisive issue, the Arizona Attorney General's Office focus on the secondary crimes caused from illegal migration seems the most appropriate. By combating the key elements of human smuggling such as money laundering, the Attorney General's Office has the additional benefit of raising human smuggling fees, deterring illegal migration, and decreasing the likelihood of secondary crimes such as auto theft from occurring.

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