

INSIDE TraCCC

TERRORISM, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND CORRUPTION CENTER

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School of Public Policy

The Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) is the first center in the United States devoted to understanding the links between terrorism, transnational crime and corruption, and to teaching, researching, training and helping to formulate policy on these critical issues. TraCCC is a research center within the School of Public Policy at George Mason University.

On April 30 TraCCC hosted two events: the first of three book launches for the new National Defense University (NDU) publication *Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization* and a meeting with nine parliamentarians from the European Parliament's *Special Committee on Organized*

Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering. This edition of INSIDE TraCCC gives highlights of the speakers' remarks at the book launch and the discussion with parliamentarians that followed. Also included is a short summary of Dr. Shelley's chapter in *Convergence* on "Money Laundering into Real Estate."

IN THIS ISSUE

Convergence.....	1
From Dagestan to Boston.....	1
Hezbollah's Global Footprint.....	3
Human Smuggling on the US-Mexico Border:	
1) California and Texas.....	5
2) Arizona.....	7
Cracking Cyber Networks.....	8
Student Research:	
Pakistan's Kidney Bazaar.....	10
Corporate Raiding in Russia.....	12
Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security.....	14
EU Parliamentarians Meet on Transnational Crime.....	15
Money Laundering into Real Estate.....	16
Alumni Activities.....	19
TraCCC in the News.....	20
TraCCC Calendar.....	20

FROM DAGESTAN TO BOSTON

BY DR. LOUISE SHELLEY

We do not yet understand the motivations of the perpetrators of the Boston Marathon bombing. With Tamerlan Tsarnaev's death, and the killing of his fellow Chechen, Ibragim Todashev, we may never have a satisfactory explanation. But we do have some clues that Tsarnaev, like many other suspected terrorists, operated in a geography where criminal and terrorist networks intersect, and are nurtured by a high level of violence and corruption.

Even by Russian standards, Dagestan, where Tsarnaev spent six months from January to July 2012, is notorious for its astronomical rates of crime, corruption, violence and unemployment. In a 2005 World Bank study of civil wars and criminal violence, I teamed up with Yuri Andrienko, a Russian econometrician, to write the chapter on Russia. We found that the spillover effects of the war in Chechnya had left Dagestan and neighboring republics with high levels of sociopolitical conflict. Homicide rates in Dagestan were particularly high. Things haven't improved in the intervening years. Recent years have seen the assassination of a member of the Supreme Court, the Minister of Interior and a major Sufi cleric, to cite only the best known victims. According to Russian statistics, 262 "terrorist acts" were committed in Dagestan during the first 11 months of 2012, while 217 "suspected militants" were killed by Dagestani authorities.

Most spectacularly, during Tsarnaev's six month visit to Makhachkala, there were two successful suicide bombings directed at law enforcement personnel. On March 6, 2012, a female suicide bomber

detonated a bomb in Karabudakhent, about 30 miles from Makhachkala, killing five policemen and wounding two more. Just two months later, on May 4, on the outskirts of Makhachkala, a double suicide bombing killed 14 people—again mainly law enforcement—and injured more than 100, including 57 police officers.ⁱⁱ The high toll of security personnel resulted because the second bomb was timed to go off after police and fire officials set up a security perimeter to deal with the first explosion. There is no reason to believe that Tsarnaev was connected to either of these events. But like everyone else in that republic of two million people, he was witness to their impact.



The links between corruption and terrorism are easy to see in Dagestan and in the entire North Caucasus region. At a recent seminar sponsored by the TraCCC Center in Stavropol, a representative of the Interior Ministry said that the threats of terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, and counterfeiting are all rooted in organized crime.ⁱⁱⁱ Another local official drew attention to the pervasive corruption in the government's social institutions, which he blamed for creating an environment conducive to organized crime. The TraCCC Center's director pointed to the recent arrest of a criminal band accused of funneling over US\$3 million into the black market. Overzealous tax inspections by corrupt officials are driving a rapid expansion of the shadow economy in the region as busi-

nesses are forced to close officially but may continue to operate. In the more prosperous Stavropol region, 10,000 businesses have officially closed. No wonder that "jobs are as scarce as hens' teeth" as the local saying goes.

In March of this year, a small group of Dagestani policemen, appalled by the level of corruption in the local law enforcement establishment, began a public campaign to get the authorities in Moscow to investigate the situation. Among other abuses, they painted a picture of lucrative collusion between leaders of Dagestan's Interior Ministry, and the "Islamist" fighters to distill and distribute illegal alcohol.^{iv}

Where does that leave us? In an unclear space. We don't know much about Tsarnaev's stay in Dagestan, nor the impact it had on him. There are indications that Tsarnaev may have been involved in criminal activities before his visit to Dagestan, and that he and Ibragim Todashev may have been suspects in a drug related triple murder in Massachusetts in 2011. Although no definitive links can now be made to this crime, Tsarnaev's hijacking of a car in the days after the bombing, reveals that he was not immune to committing ordinary criminal violence.

Clearly, we need to do more research – on the links between criminal and terror networks and on the impact that conflicts in distant lands can have on our global-mobile society. But we also need to better understand the role of individual personalities, and how they are affected by exposure to an atmosphere of continual violence, crime and corruption.

- i. "Crime, Violence and Political Conflict in Russia," (with Yuri Andrienko) in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis* ed. Nicholas Sambanis, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005, pp. 87-117
- ii. "Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report", by Gordon Hahn, Issue #60 August 31 2012, p. 12-13
- iii. The comments in this paragraph were all made at the conference sponsored by Stavropol's TraCCC center entitled *Police and Society: Problems Faced in Effectively Combating Organized Crime*.
- iv. Susan Richards, "Has Russia Abandoned Dagestan?", *Open Democracy*, April 10, 2013

[\[Back to page 1\]](#)

HEZBOLLAH

The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God

The April 12 presentation by Matthew Levitt, attended by an audience of 40+ on a stormy morning, focused on his upcoming book: *Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God*, which is being published by Georgetown University Press. The book will be published in late August, but is already available for pre-orders on Amazon. Levitt said that his book challenges many traditional assumptions about Hezbollah and the Qods Force (QF), the elite unit of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which acts as Hezbollah's senior partner, funder and mentor.

Hezbollah has long had a global footprint, but Levitt has traced Hezbollah's renewed focus on executing terrorist plots around the world to the February 2008 assassination of Imad Mughniyah, a key Hezbollah military commander, who had the trust of Iranian QF leaders. As long as Mughniyah was involved, the Iranians felt no need to micromanage Hezbollah. The Iranians were the senior partners in what the US intelligence community now describes as a "strategic partnership," providing a generous subsidy of \$100 to \$200 million annually. The goals of the two organizations were closely aligned.



Hezbollah Leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah - photo by Anton Nossik

Levitt argues that Hezbollah has always been more than just a proxy for Iran, since it has three distinct, often competing identities: a Lebanese political and military force that cares deeply about developments inside Lebanon, and even

more so about its position in Lebanon; a pan-Shiite movement defending other Shiite minorities, and a "strategic partner" of Iran. In the years following 9/11, Hezbollah was keen to keep itself out of the crosshairs of the war on terrorism. Hezbollah chose not to put its global terrorist network at risk by challenging the U.S. directly, but rather to concentrate on building up military assets in Lebanon, and focusing its terrorist attacks on Israeli targets.

"Hezbollah demonstrates sophistication, resourcefulness, and innovation in using legal business structures to camouflage their activities."

According to Levitt, this strategy changed after the 2008 assassination of Mughniyah, and particularly after January 2010, when a leading Iranian physicist, Masoud Ali Mohammadi, was assassinated in Tehran, marking the tipping point in a "shadow war" between Iran and the West, especially Israel and the U.S. As the pressure on Iran in-

creased, the Iranians pushed Hezbollah to go on the attack and stage terrorist actions around the world, with a focus on Israeli tourists and other "soft" targets. Meanwhile Qods Force concentrated on attacking "harder" Israeli and Western targets, such as embassies and officials.

The problem with this strategy was that it placed a premium on quick results, which, after almost a decade of shifting resources away from foreign operations capabilities, decreased the careful planning and tradecraft that had characterized Hezbollah operations in earlier years. It has placed Hezbollah back in the sights of U.S. and Israeli intelligence, and caused damage to existing successful Hezbollah networks, including a weapons pipeline to Gaza and an explosives transshipment hub in Bangkok. It has also meant that Hezbollah and Qods Force have found themselves operating in the same places simultaneously, without the opportunity for coordination or "de-confliction."

The result has been a series of embarrassments and foiled plots spread over a wide geographic area including Cyprus, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, India, Thailand, Malaysia, South Africa, Kenya, Kuwait, and the U.S. Hezbollah succeeded in bombing a busload of Israeli tourists in Bulgaria in July 2012, killing five tourists and the bus driver,


but their other efforts misfired due to sloppy operational security, poor tradecraft and a lack of coordination. Levitt cautions, however, that even though U.S. authorities succeeded in foiling a plot in 2012 to kill the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, there are no grounds for complacency. The organization is learning from its mistakes, and we should expect continuing – and better planned – attacks in the future.

Levitt also discussed Hezbollah's wide-ranging and sophisticated criminal activities, which, he said, currently net the organization millions of dollars annually and could in time, if they do not already, provide Hezbollah an income comparable to Hezbollah's subsidy from Iran. Drug trafficking remains the most profitable sphere of crime for Hezbollah, mostly via "Highway 10" or the 10th parallel. This route runs from South and Central America, across the Atlantic Ocean to West Africa, and then into Europe. Hezbollah operatives have used stolen weapons from Iraq to pay FARC for the Colombian cocaine. Hezbollah is also heavily involved in counterfeiting drugs – especially Viagra and Captagon (a form of amphetamine) which is produced in Lebanon and shipped throughout the Middle East, particularly to Saudi Arabia. Levitt mentioned Ayman Joumma, the Hezbollah-affiliated kingpin of a drug-trafficking and money laundering operation who is reported to have laundered \$200 million per month in drug money through operations in Lebanon, West Africa, Panama and Colombia, using money exchanges, bulk cash smuggling and other schemes.

Other illegal activities by Hezbollah run the gamut from weapons smuggling, counterfeiting of documents and currency, to credit card fraud, stolen cars, smuggled cigarettes and human trafficking. According to Levitt, Hezbollah demonstrates sophistication, resourcefulness, and innovation in using legal business structures to camouflage their illicit activities. In particular, they make wide use of Lebanese diaspora business spread around the world, some of whom participate willingly, while others participate due to intimidation or infiltration.

During the Q&A period of his presentation, Levitt was asked about Hezbollah's ties with North Korea, the impact of the current struggle in Syria, and

Hezbollah's ability to gain access to advanced technology. Levitt replied that no one has found evidence of Hezbollah having ties with North Korea, although they may exist. On Syria, he said that concern should not be about advanced technology, but about the fate of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal. Hezbollah has set up training camps near Syrian chemical weapons depots, and there is concern that they may gain access to the weapons after Assad's fall. Another concern is Hezbollah's potential role in a post-Assad Syria. Levitt said that Hezbollah wants to have its own proxies in Syria and appears to be staking out a claim to the Latakia region, through which Iran could continue to send weapons, missiles and more as it has over so many years.



For details on Matthew Levitt's book, see the [Georgetown University Press website](#).

[\[Back to page 1\]](#)

HUMAN SMUGGLING ACROSS THE CA & TX BORDERS

Summary Findings of the Human Smuggling Attribute Study

On 19 April 2013 a panel of experts from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the Homeland Security Study and Analysis Institute, and the International Assessment and Strategy Center presented the summary findings of a soon-to-be-published open source article focusing on human smuggling activities along the Southwest U.S. Border from 2008-2011. The project team is in the process of finalizing the article and it will be available later this year.

The study argues that the smuggling of migrants from Mexico to the United States is on the decline, and suggested a number of reasons for this: a long-term decline in birthrates in Mexico, a weak job market in the United States, increased border security, increased deportations, and fear of violence along smuggling routes in Mexico. These findings have been echoed in other studies, including a 2012 Pew Hispanic Center study, which found that more Mexicans are currently leaving the United States than are entering.

The study reaffirmed estimates that cross-border human smuggling generates billions of dollars a year. However, it found that these proceeds are difficult for authorities to seize, because profits are widely dispersed among many actors in small amounts. Human smuggling networks are diffuse networks of "free agents" who specialize in one aspect of the trade, including: guides, smugglers, facilitators, transporters, couriers, security specialists, stash house operators, etc. As one speaker put it, "People are in it to make a living, not a killing." In this and many other respects, human smuggling networks are very different from the drug smuggling organizations that operate within the same geographic area.

There is a variety of smuggling pathways along the border, and each one operates somewhat differently. The study focused on El Paso and San Diego, each of which has its own ways of doing busi-

ness. For example, migrants entering the United States from Ciudad Juarez into El Paso are taken across the border in small groups and delivered to a "stash house" – often a family home. They stay inside and are fed and clothed until the next stage of the journey takes them to the interior of the United States. Payment is generally in two installments: half in Mexico and the second half after a safe arrival in the United States.

"The study argues that the smuggling of migrants from Mexico to the United States is on the decline, and suggests a number of reasons."

The Tijuana-San Diego crossing, by contrast, usually takes place during the course of a single day, and there are three possible routes: by sea, over the mountains, or through a legal border crossing with false documents. In this geographic area, the human smuggling process is generally done on cred-

it. Once across the border, the migrants are transported immediately to Los Angeles, where the "hand-off" and "buyout" take place – usually to relatives and always in cash.

In both cases, according to the authors, the migrants "get what they pay for." Those who can afford to pay higher fees will have a less dangerous and more comfortable crossing. They also emphasized the importance of trust and interpersonal relationships throughout the operation. In many cases, the smugglers have long term relationships with their clients and

"...the migrants "get what they pay for." Those who can afford to pay higher fees will have a less dangerous, more comfortable crossing."

their villages of origin. Migrants, their family members, and their friends often use the same smugglers for multiple crossings. If a migrant gets caught and sent back to Mexico, the smuggler may provide a crossing for free or at a reduced cost the next time. This practice is, in part, to discourage migrants from giving in-

formation to law enforcement.

The decline in Mexicans seeking to cross the border has led the smugglers to seek new and more lucrative markets. Central and South Americans seeking to cross to the United States pay higher fees (\$4,000 to \$12,000 per crossing, versus \$3,000 to \$6,000 for Mexicans) but their numbers are also

down. Far more lucrative are the growing numbers of migrants from Asia, Africa, India and the Middle East—who sometimes pay between \$60,000 and \$80,000 for a voyage that can take eight to ten months and have five or six transit stops. For them, the experience is not just longer and more expensive, but also much more difficult and dangerous, and relationships are not trust or credit-based. Indeed, smugglers report that they prefer to work with Chinese or other “exotic” clients because they can squeeze more money out of them along the course of the smuggling venture.



Following the presentation there was a lively Q&A session with the audience, which included approximately 35 individuals, and represented several different nationalities and vantage points. One line of discussion concerned the connection between human trafficking and smuggling. A UK visitor pointed out that many individuals come into the UK through smuggling networks, but then become prey to traffickers once they are in the country, and find that they cannot get work or benefits without papers. The panel replied that in the United States there is less overlap between traffickers and smugglers, and that human traffickers in the United States are often able to provide “legal” visas for their victims. Participants also discussed the system of payment. The panel described the growing use of “funnel accounts”, whereby one individual sets up an account and then the money is “funneled” in and out on a daily basis, in small amounts, which require no identification and do not attract attention from authorities.

[\[Back to page 1\]](#)

HUMAN SMUGGLING ACROSS THE ARIZONA BORDER

A Guest Talk by Dr. Gabriella Sanchez

The U.S. border with Mexico lies squarely at the center of the heated political debate over immigration in this country. Often reduced to a monolithic symbol, the nearly 2,000 mile-long border is as diverse as the communities and landscapes it transverses. Dr. Gabriella Sanchez, Visiting Lecturer on Transnational Feminisms and Migration at Wellesley College, testified to this diversity in a presentation hosted by TraCCC on March 19, 2013, entitled *Violence as an Element of Irregular Border Crossings: Human Smuggling Operations in the U.S. Southwest*.

Dr. Sanchez's talk was based on research she conducted as a researcher in Arizona, in which she analyzed 66 state-level convictions of human smuggling between 2009 and 2011 involving Mexican citizens. Dr. Sanchez focused specifically on evaluating violence that occurred in transit on Arizona territory during the smuggling of illegal immigrants.

Dr. Sanchez, a trained anthropologist, explained that she found no evidence of deaths or severe physical harm inflicted upon illegal immigrants during their contact with their smugglers. She postulated that this was due to the strong financial incentives that both parties had to successfully complete the journey. Disagreements arising over migrants' inability to pay in full for the smuggling services were usually settled peacefully through negotiations. Occasionally, however, the smugglers extorted the rest of the payment from a migrant's family under threat of harm to the migrant in their care. In such instances, the amounts in question varied between \$300-500.



This description stands in stark contrast to the violent reality of criminal gangs and organized criminal groups involved in smuggling on other parts of the border. In the specific region studied, however, Dr. Sanchez characterized the smuggling trade as non-professional and even "community-based". At the same time, she cautioned against extrapolating her findings beyond the specific region and ethnic groups she studied.

Interestingly, Dr. Sanchez revealed that, in the cases she examined, illegal immigrants being smuggled only faced the threat of severe violence in transit when they were kidnapped by *bajadores*. These small, informal gangs kidnap migrants in passage and extract ransom from their families of \$2,500-3,000. Since *bajadores* must overwhelm the smugglers protecting the migrants in their custody, the amount illegal immigrants are able to pay for smuggling services has a direct effect on their personal safety, as higher sums provide access to experienced and better-armed smugglers.

[\[Back to page 1\]](#)

CRACKING ILLICIT CYBER NETWORKS

An Interview with Dr. Damon McCoy

Dr. McCoy teaches Computer Sciences at GMU. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Colorado in Boulder and was a Computer Innovation Fellow at the University of California, San Diego. His research includes work on wireless privacy, anonymous communication systems, cyber-physical security, and the economics of e-crime. He is part of a team that received a \$10 million "Frontier" grant from the National Science Foundation in September 2012 to tackle the technological and economic aspects of internet security. In 2013 he received a Google Research Award for a project on "Understanding the Business of Traffic Distribution System Services."

What got you interested in issues of computer crime?

DM: First, I approached it from the technology side. We were looking for ways to combat spam, and we tried everything possible to fight it at the technological level, trying to make computers more secure, using filters, etc. But we made no headway. So then we decided that it was time to step back and take a more holistic approach. We needed to understand how spam works, and – most importantly – how people make money from it. So we decided to map out every link in the chain from start to finish: domain names, business methods, how spam is sent, how money comes in, how payment works, and what happens when the purchase is made. So we learned a great deal about banking and credit card infrastructure.

It turns out that in order to accept payments by major credit cards over the internet you need to go to a bank and set up a merchant account. And we discovered that there are effectively three banks, one each in Latvia, Azerbaijan and Saint Kitts and Nevis, who host 95% of the spam accounts. So that gave us one angle to attack the problem from.

What did you do next?

"We needed to understand how spam works, and – most importantly – how people make money from it."

DM: We talked to policy makers and credit card associations, and got them to enact some new rules. Visa agreed to start a global brand protection program, under which Visa will shut down the merchant accounts of any entity that sells counterfeit goods, if the brand name holder files a complaint. We decided to focus on two areas: counterfeit software and pharmaceuticals, and we worked with a major software developer and a major pharmaceutical company who filed complaints. Then we spent two years mapping and measuring the results. It turned out that our work had a major impact in the software space and led to a near eradication of programs selling illicit software over the internet.

But we had less of an impact in the pharmaceutical sector, which is a much bigger and more profitable business. The major illicit pharmaceutical distributors are in Russia. The spammers basically act as independent marketing agents for the pharmacies. They call them *partnery*. They drive traffic to the pharmacies, and in turn they get a commission – up to 50% of the sales revenue – when a sale comes through the traffic that they have brought in. A lot of the pharmaceuticals they sell are legally produced in India, but under generic licensing agreements that do not permit them to sell to developed countries.

Tell us about the "Frontier" Grant from the National Science Foundation. What is the focus?

DM: It is basically an expansion and extension of this work, with the aim of gaining a better understanding of how the world of modern cyber-crime works. It will be carried out by the same team of researchers, working in three institutions: UCSD, Berkeley and GMU. We are focusing on four areas: first of all, the economics of e-crime, where we are trying to get a better grasp of how cybercriminals make their money in different

scams. Then we will be looking at the role of online social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, which have become a new battleground in cyber-security. We will also look at the underground social networks that exist between cyber-criminals and are used to spread new scams. And finally, we will be looking at the outcomes of our work, and trying to measure the impact of different defenses, interventions and educational strategies.

Tell us about your cooperation with TraCCC and Dr. Shelley

We are interested in many of the same issues and have been looking to develop projects together. We both want to work on combating illicit trade in wildlife. We have great potential partners here at GMU, including the Smithsonian-Mason School of Conservation.

Currently, the emphasis is on fighting wildlife trafficking through supply reduction, focusing on improving security for endangered species by providing safer refuges, more park rangers, etc. But Louise and I are looking at it from another perspective. We want to get a better, more holistic

understanding of the transactions involved, so that we can understand who is making money on it, and how, and then we can try to put a brake on it from the demand side. Here again the internet plays a crucial role, by expanding demand and allowing people to conduct their illicit business more efficiently and anonymously.

This is your second year at George Mason. Tell us what you like best about it, and where you think we need improvement.

DM: George Mason's location makes it the perfect place to bring together the academic and policy worlds. In the Washington area, we have direct access to policy makers at all levels. Many of them teach on our faculty. But despite this proximity, we stay in our silos. There is not nearly as much interaction as there should be. The Fairfax campus seems remote from the School of Public Policy in Arlington. I would like to see more interaction and better collaboration across schools, departments and campuses.

[\[Back to page 1\]](#)

STUDENT RESEARCH: PAKISTAN'S KIDNEY BAZAAR

by Rubab Azeem

This is the summary of a research paper written for Dr. Shelley's graduate course on Human Trafficking by Rubab Azeem, a graduate student in the School of Public Policy at GMU with an emphasis on Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption. She is pursuing a Master's Degree and a graduate certificate in National Security and Public Policy. Originally from Pakistan, Ms. Azeem received her B.A. in History and B.S. in Public Policy from the University of Charleston, WV. Her areas of interest are immigration and global security with a special interest in U.S.-Pakistan Relations. The full paper, with bibliography and footnotes, can be accessed [here](#).

Pakistan, a country of about 160 million inhabitants, has become the center of illegal renal (kidney) transplants. A recent WHO report ranked Pakistan as one of the top five organ-trafficking hotspots, along with China, Colombia, Egypt and the Philippines. Kidneys are the most commonly trafficked organ because they can be easily removed and preserved. In Pakistan, about 6,500 kidneys are sold every year. In addition, there have been reports of intestines, pancreases, lungs, and corneas being sold in Pakistan's black market for organs.

The problem of organ trafficking in Pakistan began in the mid-1990s, when a majority of unrelated transplants began to be performed on rich foreigners, who could no longer buy organs from India after the Transplantation of Human Organs Act (THOA) of 1994 made it illegal to sell organs to foreigners in India. Private clinics in Pakistan began to take advantage of this prohibition. The Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplants (SIUT), Pakistan's largest public sector transplantation center, estimated that by the year 2007, about 2,500 transplants were performed annually, of which 2,000 were commercial transplants from non-relatives, and 1,500 were for foreigners. Even after Pakistan made it illegal to sell organs to foreigners by passing the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Ordinance (THOTO) in 2007, the illegal trade continues to thrive.

"In Pakistan, about 6,500 kidneys are sold every year."



In Pakistan, organ trafficking takes advantage of the most vulnerable segment of the country. Kidney vendors tend to be poor and uneducated, working mostly in bonded labor. They sell a kidney because they do not see any other option. They have very little, if any, education. Brokers tend to take advantage of vendors' illiteracy. A study of the vendors stated that the average agreed price for sale of a kidney was \$1,737 U.S. dollars. However, none of the vendors received the promised price because they were deceived by brokers. The vendors could not take any legal action as it is illegal to sell an organ to non-related person for profit in Pakistan.

Selling a kidney carries negative social, psychological, and emotional consequences that extend far beyond the vendor to the immediate and extended family and also to the community. As Dr. Rizvi of SIUT has stated, "the post-operative neglect of donors is the most sickening aspect of the kidney trade." The vendors are not given adequate post-operative care, often leaving them with psychological problems and infections that prevent them from returning to work and making them a burden to their families and communities. Recipients can also experience problems after transplants, due to unsanitary medical procedures.

There is no single solution to deter organ trafficking in Pakistan, as various factors contribute to the problem, but a number of steps are needed. To start with, people selling kidneys should be referred to as 'vendors' not 'donors' since in almost all cases, they are forced into this action by poverty, lack of opportunity, and/or physical threats. Second, education is essential to curb organ trade

and to create awareness about the negative consequences of organ trafficking. Pakistan should implement THOTO and develop a system of cadaveric transplants that would require its citizens to have a donor card similar to the National Identification Card. Creating this system will be difficult, due to corruption, illiteracy and poor medical standards. Nevertheless, Pakistan should strive to create a transplant system with proper oversight by someone like Dr. Rizvi of SIUT. Dr. Rizvi has been a strong opponent of the organ trade since its beginning in Pakistan. He is an outstanding example of what can be achieved in Pakistan with the right leadership and proper resources. He established SIUT, which continues to set the standards for the treatment of urological and renal disease in Pakistan, and offers free services for patients who cannot afford to pay.

The issues concerning organ trafficking should not only be dealt with as matters of health but also as a matter of justice. Organ trafficking around the world follows the economic law of supply and demand. Long waiting lists create a demand for organs and the supply of organs comes from des-

“A study of the vendors stated that the average agreed price for sale of a kidney was \$1,737 U.S. dollars.”

perate individuals with no other option but to sell a kidney. On the demand side, countries with long waiting lists should build transparent, reliable systems of organ donation through altruistic donations from healthy individuals and deceased donors. Until these donation systems are created and utilized, poor and vulnerable individuals are at risk for being targeted to supply organs to privileged patients.

The root causes of organ trafficking in Pakistan are poverty, a high unemployment rate, a high illiteracy rate, the absence of health care regulations for kidney transplants, inefficient implementation of THOTO due to corruption, gender and ethnic discrimination; and political instability and border conflicts. To curb the illicit trade, Pakistan needs to implement the THOTO and assist the victims of this crime by providing them with better health care post-operation and by prosecuting the actors involved. This includes the recipients suffering from kidney failure. They are just as guilty as the gangs, kidney mafias, doctors, brokers, government and law enforcement agencies.

[\[Back to page 1\]](#)

CORPORATE RAIDING AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN RUSSIA

by Aaron Beitman

Like any rational economic actor, organized crime groups seek to maximize utility, namely its. That said, the costs that organized crime groups are prepared to face in the process of obtaining profits are quite different than those of an ordinary firm. Costs might include committing murder or assault, facing death, lengthy prison sentences, and assets confiscation by the state, among others. While growth is uneven across the Russian economy, certain sectors, such as real estate and transportation continue to attract investment. Unfortunately, growth industries also attract the attention of organized crime groups.

What factors exacerbate the impact of organized crime on the Russian economy? [Writing in The John Marshall Law Review](#), TraCCC Director Louise Shelley notes that the problem of organized crime in Russia's economy is exacerbated by the absence of appropriate legal frameworks. Moreover, Thomas Firestone, former Resident Legal Advisor at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow [adds that legacies](#) from the Soviet legal system have created conditions for weak property rights protections and even the use of legal means for property expropriation.



Road Sign: Vladivostok

Contemporary examples abound, illustrating how Russia's legal system can work counterproductively for growth in the country's economy. Tatyana Kvasnikova, a graduate student in law and criminology at Far East Federal University in Vladivostok,


explores these topics in research supported by a grant for junior scholars from [TraCCC's Saratov Center](#).

“The key figure in the organized crime group's legal team was Vitalii Beregovskii, who had made a name for himself as a local anti-corruption crusader.”

In particular, Kvasnikova highlights the problem of corporate raiding in the real estate and transportation sectors, which is often accomplished through exploitation of the legal system. Corporate raiding in the real estate sector, as well as in other areas of the Russian economy, is executed only with the assistance of a variety of government officials, as well as skilled lawyers and accountants. In her report, Kvasnikova provides a number of case studies illustrating the

extent of organized crime activity in the real estate and transportation sectors. One of these cases is described below.

The corporate raid on OOO OGAT, a transport company based in Russia's Far East, came as a surprise to authorities, given that the company controlled 17 hectares of land valued at \$17 million, 70 large transport vehicles otherwise unobtainable in the regime, as well as 16 buildings. Official records indicated that OOO OGAT's yearly tax contribution was estimated at \$750,000. SPARK-INTERFAX, a Russian news firm, [reported](#) that the company made profits of \$8.3 million in 2007, before the corporate raiding attack on OOO OGAT began.



According to official documents, the leader of the criminal group which illegally took over OOO OGAT was a resident of Vladivostok, Dmitrii Sanzharov, the son of a former regional court judge. The hierarchy and organization of responsibilities in this criminal organization was highly precise. All operatives were divided into groups, each of which was governed by a clearly defined communication structure. Operational groups included security and economic divisions, the lat-

ter of which had as members a number of prominent local entrepreneurs. Group operatives employed a variety of sophisticated technical and informational technology methods to falsify documents and to collect intelligence on targets. In addition, operatives conducted “false-flag” operations aimed at discrediting competing organized crime groups. However, the key operatives in the capture of OOO OGAT were those belonging to the group’s legal team.

Sanzharov’s legal team was tasked with supporting corporate raiding activities in the courts and other state agents, basically to provide a veneer of legality. With respect to the illegal takeover of OOO OGAT, the legal team’s main goal was to obtain and manipulate key company documents. The crucial figure in the organized crime group’s legal team was Vitalii Beregovskii, who had made a name for himself as a local anti-corruption crusader. Taking advantage of a major conflict between OOO OGAT’s owners, Beregovskii secured the right to represent one of the parties to the conflict. In January 2008, Beregovskii then maneuvered to have an individual loyal to the organized crime group elected as chair of OOO OGAT’s board of directors, while one of the company’s founders, Igor Oganessian, was given responsibilities that made him of particular interest to Sanzharov’s group.

In March and April 2008, members of Sanzharov’s group stole a number of key documents from OOO OGAT’s headquarters, the falsification of which later facilitated the sale of most of the company’s key assets. In May 2008, the group initiated a violent attack on Oganessian, in which documents verifying Oganessian’s rights as a founder of OOO OGAT were stolen.

Konstantin Radchuk, a lawyer representing OGAT in a number of legal proceedings, attempted to deflect the attacks on the company, successfully winning a case in the regional arbitration court which found changes made to the company’s founding documents to be illegal. At this point, the raiders decided that it was time to begin selling off the company’s assets to third parties. In September 2008, representatives of the organized

crime group went to the Federal Registration Service office in Vladivostok, but were refused in their request to change to the legal status of the company. The reason for the refused request was that Radchuk had identified the raiders and provided the Federal Registration Service with documents confirming the illegality of the raiders activities.

“...the leader of the criminal group which illegally took over OOO OGAT was a resident of Vladivostok, Dmitrii Sanzharov, the son of a former regional court judge.”

Unfortunately for a number of individuals involved, Sanzharov’s group did not take kindly to efforts aimed at slowing their profiteering. Members of the organized crime group subsequently planned a violent attack on the Federal Registration Service official who refused their request to change OOO OGAT’s legal status. The group also beat to death Dmitrii Baev, the head of the economic

crimes division of a district investigative committee looking into the case, as well as Baev’s father. In May 2009, the group completed its revenge upon Igor Oganessian, murdering him outside the elevator in his apartment building. The group, however, was unable to exact revenge on Radchuk.

At the moment, authorities have detained eleven members of Sanzharov’s group, though Sanzharov himself remains at large, albeit with an international warrant for his arrest. Law enforcement officials have apparently confiscated eight heavy weapons, three weapon silencers, ammunition, and twenty sticks of TNT. Additional investigations have implicated Sanzharov’s group in organized crime activities in a number of other regions of Russia.

Although Sanzharov’s group was unable to complete their goal of capturing and selling off all of OOO OGAT’s assets, the group’s skilled manipulation of the Russian legal system is highly disturbing. That Sanzharov’s group was able to get as far as they did before being halted by OOO OGAT lawyer Konstantin Radchuk’s effective intervention suggests that significant changes to Russian business law are in order.

For further reading on these topics and others, please visit TraCCC’s extensive online library [here](#).

[\[Back to page 1\]](#)

CONVERGENCE: ILLICIT NETWORKS & NATIONAL SECURITY

Launch of a new publication from the NDU Press

Money Laundering into Real Estate is an excerpt from Dr Louise Shelley's chapter in the recently released book *Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization*, published by NDU Press. This chapter was developed from a report prepared by the author for the Organized Crime Global Agenda Council of the World Economic Forum. The author appreciates the support of the council members who provided sources to conduct this research and also highlighted important trends they observed in their own regions.

Five of the authors who contributed chapters to *Convergence* spoke at the panel discussion, which was moderated by Greg Gatjanis, former NSC director for Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Narcotics, and one of the drafters of the National Security Staff's 2011 *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*.



Left to right: Greg Gatjanis, Louise Shelley, Michael Miklaucic, Danielle Lindholm and David Luna

Here are some highlights of their presentations:

- Michael Miklaucic, director of the Center for Complex Operations at NDU and co-editor of *Convergence*, said that the book's basic premise is that the transformative improvements in transportation and communications of recent decades have transformed the threat posed by illicit networks from a nuisance to a national security threat. He said that corruption is present worldwide, but it is important to make a distinction between corrupt states and countries where illicit networks have "captured" the state and succeeded in placing their own people in the government. To illustrate the distinction he cited South Africa, where there is corruption, but the government is fighting against it, and Guinea Bissau, where the state has lost all capacity to fight corruption. The final stage of this process is the "Criminal State" where the government is overtly and explicitly involved in criminal behavior. Examples include North Korea (currently the world's second-largest manufacturer of \$100 bills) and Liberia under Charles Taylor.
- Doug Farah, a former *Washington Post* reporter who co-authored the book *Merchant of Death*, spoke of the disappearing geographical and ideological boundaries among the "Fixers, Super Fixers, and Shadow Facilitators" who provide the logistical support and supplies that are needed for the world's criminal networks to function on a global scale. These fixers, for the most part, are individuals who survive regime changes, and operate in the interest of profits, not ideology. They are essential, because most of the people who produce illicit goods are specialized both functionally and geographically. Viktor Bout was the best known – and perhaps the most effective-- of the super-fixers, because of his reliability, his access to Soviet weapons and his willingness to work with anyone on any continent, but there are many others who are currently operating.
- Danielle Lindholm, Technical Director at BAE Systems and co-chair of the American Bar Association's International Anti-Money-Laundering Committee, emphasized the need to fight networks with networks, and cited three successful examples in the public and private sectors. The Afghan Threat Finance Cell is a multi-agency organization, established in 2009 and led by DEA and Treasury, which brings together specialists from a variety of government departments, intelligence and law enforcement agencies in order to identify and disrupt financial networks related to terrorism, the Taliban, narcotics trafficking and corruption. Another example is the U.S. Special Operation Command's (USSOCOM) Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Working Group, which includes experts from industry, think tanks, universities and the private sector. A third example is the Financial Intelligence and Information Sharing Working Group (FIIS WG),

which began in 2010 with US government sponsorship, but is now sponsored by the American Security Project (a non-profit think tank) and brings together more than 500 experts on money laundering and terrorist finance from government, academia and the private sector.

- David Luna, Director of Anti-Crime programs in the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, discussed U.S.G. experience in working bilaterally with governments and with international organizations to share information and combat crime, corruption, money laundering and terrorist financing. On bilateral cooperation he highlighted information sharing with Afghanistan, Colombia and Indonesia. He noted that the U.S. works with a wide number of regional organizations, such as the EU, OAS, APEC, ASEAN and the African Union, along with international entities such as the UN, the World Bank and the OECD. Other partners include private sector organizations such as the World Economic Forum, and industry groupings in sectors where illicit trade is rife, including pharmaceuticals, alcohol and tobacco.

- Dr Louise Shelley, Director and Founder of TraCCC, discussed money laundering in real estate (MLRE). She views it as an under-researched subject deserving greater attention due to its material and symbolic significance. When criminals and corrupt officials buy expensive real estate and beautiful homes, it is seen by their constituents as a visible manifestation that corruption and crime really do pay. MLRE can also distort real estate markets by exacerbating economic bubbles and pricing ordinary buyers out of the market. At the other end of the market, money launderers sometimes buy low-end properties and leave them vacant, leading to urban decay and depopulation of rural areas. The decade since 9/11 has seen much attention placed on the regulation of banks and global financial markets, but this in turn has led to an influx of illicit funds into real estate. It is time to enact harmonized measures to ensure that real estate professionals are made accountable for "knowing their customers" and playing a central role in countering MLRE. (See [below](#) for Dr Shelley's chapter on MLRE in *Convergence*)

[\[Back to page 1\]](#)

EU PARLIAMENTARIANS MEET ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

On April 30th, TraCCC hosted a meeting between a delegation from the EU and a group of specialists in transnational crime based in the DC area.

The EU delegation is drafting legislation to be presented to the European Parliament to help member-states fight organized crime, money laundering and corruption. The 15-member delegation was in Washington to study the U.S. experience post 9-11.



Having met with representatives of ICE, the FBI and DEA, one European remarked that he was struck by the complexity and duplication inherent in the U.S. system, and wondered how it is possible to operate efficiently when there are so many different agencies collecting data and working in task forces. U.S. speakers said this complexity is the reason why the National Security Staff's 2011 *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime* was based on a single principle: to build, balance and integrate the capabilities that exist, and encourage allies to do likewise. The goal is not just efficiency, but also stability. Each of the U.S. agencies brings a slightly different perspective to the mix, has a different emphasis and collects somewhat different data. Congressional mandates also play a role in the apparent duplication of U.S. agencies. Still, the speed with which the Boston Marathon bombers were caught suggests that the bureaucracies have learned to cooperate effectively in a crisis. A European speaker, currently at GMU, argued forcefully that the U.S. system is far more efficient than the European

one. He said that the only large child pornography cases that have been successfully prosecuted in Europe are ones where the Europeans have partnered with U.S. authorities. Another European delegate commented that in many European countries one cannot even talk openly about the problem of corruption and the important role it plays.

One European visitor asked why U.S. authorities consistently cite Colombia as a success story, since Colombia remains the world's third biggest producer and exporter of cocaine. U.S. speakers replied that over the last 20 years Colombia has essentially faced two struggles (1) against the drug trade and (2) to save the state which was crumbling and unable to act. Colombia has succeeded in breaking the Medellin and Cali cartels and taking on the FARC. The state is now stable and secure, despite a significant crime problem. However, they have not succeeded in dismantling the cocaine trade. This will require action in curbing demand for the drug, not just supply.

U.S. speakers also noted a disturbing trend in Colombia, whereby the FARC, over time, has gotten deeply involved in the drug trade, and is splintering into smaller criminal bands. Ideology is on the backburner, and they are essentially turning into bands of highly armed drug lords. There are signs that the Taliban in Afghanistan may follow a similar path, and Al Qaeda in the Maghreb as well. During the discussion on Afghanistan, both sides agreed that the combination of the Taliban and the drug trade is creating a situation of considerable instability as U.S. and European forces draw down.

A European delegate asked if there is evidence of criminal groups from different countries moving into each other's territories and cooperating. U.S. speakers replied affirmatively, citing an influx of Russian-speaking crime organizations in Mexico, and evidence of Colombian organizations setting up bases in West Africa. This is part of a new trend of criminal organizations making strategic partnerships and operating outside of their traditional home countries and cultures.

The European visitors noted that some progress has been made on money laundering in Europe. EU laws and national laws now ban the purchase of real estate with cash and are requiring real estate agents to ask the source of all funds to be used for purchases of real estate at the outset of the process. This is unlike the case in the U.S. where banks closely scrutinize the funding sources for real estate loans, but are less vigilant when credit is not involved.


The Europeans also asked about tax evasion in the U.S. and whether it is prosecuted as organized crime. U.S. speakers replied that the IRS works with other agencies on tax evasion cases and the FBI has a financial crimes unit. Traditionally, tax evasion has been less of an issue in the U.S. than in Europe, as Americans have been less prone to tax evasion than many Europeans. However, tax evasion is still taken seriously in the U.S. and has served as the basis for the arrest and incarceration of many individuals involved in organized crime from Al Capone to the present day.

MONEY LAUNDERING INTO REAL ESTATE

by Dr. Louise Shelley

Money laundering into real estate (MLRE) did not end with the movement of organized crime investment into Las Vegas even though many real estate professionals would like to think otherwise. Rather, MLRE is an enduring but insufficiently recognized international problem. Corrupt leaders, organized crime groups, and terrorist organizations channel large quantities of illicitly obtained funds into real estate daily as a way to disguise the criminal origin of their proceeds and to integrate them into the formal economy. These illicit funds are

invested into residential and commercial real estate as well as into farmlands and tourist properties. MLRE has a long history because it has typically been a relatively safe and prestigious investment.



MLRE by criminal groups and corrupt officials has been identified on every continent but has failed to command the attention it deserves as a criminal activity. Surprisingly, there has been very little research done on the real estate market as a vehicle for money launderers. The few research studies of the problem are limited primarily to the Netherlands and Italy. Indeed, there is little systematic research examining this problem anywhere outside Europe. At the same time, a number of significant prosecutions reveal that the profits of organized crime are often invested in real estate. That is particularly true of investigations into human trafficking, whose proceeds have been traced by European law enforcement agencies to villas in Romania and to hotels, bars, and restaurants in Turkey and the Netherlands. A major prosecution of Russian organized crime in Germany revealed many expensive real estate purchases in the Stuttgart area by members of a well-known post-Soviet crime group.

The lack of official attention to MLRE may result in part from the fact that this form of money laundering can have significant benefits for the recipient country by contributing to construction, adding jobs, and bringing investment into the economy. MLRE occurs in diverse locales in both the developed and developing worlds, although certain locales are particularly known for this problem (the Mediterranean coast of Spain and France, Sicily, Dubai, and the high-end resort areas in Mexico.)

“the problem of MLRE appears to have grown since restrictions were tightened on other financial transactions post-9/11”

Both commercial and residential real estate are conducive to money laundering because of the easy mixing of legitimate and illegitimate funds. An advantage of laundering into real estate is often that there is not even a cost of laundering, but rather ongoing financial benefits derived from property-based revenue streams.

The consequences of money laundered into real estate are distinct from the sums that remain in cash or cash equivalents. Purchase of expensive homes by crime figures and corrupt officials shows very visually that crime really does pay. Criminals show their success by buying valuable real estate—beautiful estates and villas as well as popular bars and nightclubs. Criminological research and popular songs in the criminal culture, especially among Latin American crime groups, show that visible signs of wealth serve as important tools for recruiting members into the criminal enterprise.

The absence or deficiencies of legislation targeting real estate money laundering make it an attractive arena for corrupt officials and criminals. Corrupt officials are more interested in enjoying and preserving capital while organized criminals more frequently launder money to hide capital, generate revenue streams, and facilitate their illicit activities. Therefore, they often choose different types of property in which to launder their investments. Politically Exposed Persons (PEPS) represent a unique case and set of money-laundering patterns.

Money stolen by corrupt foreign leaders is often destined for high-end real estate that can be enjoyed by the launderers and their families.

The United States continues to serve as an investment destination for the funds of foreign corrupt leaders. Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko bought a \$7 million home in California and was charged and prosecuted for money laundering in 2004. A recent Senate investigation examined four cases of MLRE by PEPS from Africa, including Teodoro Obiang, a son of the president of Equatorial Guinea, and family members. MLRE by PEPS can be a dramatic force for political destabilization as it shows that leaders can enjoy the fruits of corruption. Popular anger and revulsion at the wealth and opulent homes of corrupt political leaders can be a source of major discontent, particularly in poor countries. Revelations of the sump-

tuous property of Arab leaders, for example, helped fuel popular resentment before the Arab Spring.

Money laundering into construction companies can drive out legitimate investors who cannot obtain bank credits or compete against money launderers with so much disposable cash. These cash-rich investors move money not only into the property, but into the companies that will construct new developments, thereby increasing their laundering options. These practices do not always involve high-end properties. Money laundering into lower-end property may lead to decay and increased crime in urban areas. In some cases, properties are bought to launder the money and then left vacant. This has been observed in such diverse environments as rural Ohio and central Tokyo. Such decay may be allowed so the criminal investors can subsequently buy neighboring properties at depressed costs, thereby increasing their territorial influence.

Economic bubbles can be exacerbated by MLRE and ordinary citizens can be priced out of markets distorted by money launderers. This was very evident in Japan in the late 1980s. Japan was then the world's second largest economy, and *yakuza* [traditional Japanese crime organizations] members were heavily involved in real-estate and stock-market speculation. It is estimated that one-third to one-half of the bad debt that strangled Japan's economic growth was tied to the *yakuza*.

MLRE has often been more beneficial to criminals than other forms of investment in the legitimate economy, as property can provide a base for other criminal operations and/or a steady parallel income stream. *Yakuza* have become global investors in real estate. They have invested in golf courses and land in Hawaii and in hotels, resorts, and other commercial properties throughout Southeast Asia. This property facilitates their activities in the area of sex tourism.

Although there are no definitive global studies, the problem of MLRE appears to have grown since restrictions were tightened on other financial transactions post-9/11. This has been possible because in some countries and regions lacking ade-

quate controls, cash can be used to purchase real estate. Banking regulation encourages criminals to keep their assets in cash outside the banking system, enabling them to quickly take advantage of

“The lack of official attention to MLRE may result in part from the fact that this form of money laundering can have significant benefits for the recipient country.”

low prices. Criminals, therefore, have been major beneficiaries of the crisis because many of them held cash and have not been negatively affected by stock market declines. The sharp decline of real estate prices since 2008 has been exploited by criminals for both their operational benefit and to purchase real estate at sharp discounts. This has occurred in the United States and in some depressed markets in Southern and North-

ern Europe. In Italy, the Mafia is now estimated to control 7 percent of the economy and extorts and works through construction businesses and urban properties, particularly in Rome.

CONCLUSION

The decade since 9/11 has seen much attention placed on regulation of banks and global financial markets. As the collapse of the real estate bubble worldwide has shown, greater attention should be paid to real estate markets and to funds used for real estate investment. Little has been done to institutionalize the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (the chief international body addressing money laundering) to ensure that real estate markets are properly regulated and guarded against money laundering. Harmonized measures have not been put in place to ensure that real estate professionals, lawyers, notaries, and accountants are accountable and understand their responsibility to “know their customers.” There is an absence of reporting worldwide on financial irregularities and laundering in real estate markets. Not enough has been done to ensure that real estate professionals make countering money laundering a higher priority. This is a difficult time to enhance requirements when sales are down and customers are hard to find, yet it is needed if the global financial community is to prevent future crises.

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[\[Back to page 1\]](#)

ALUMNI NEWS

Where are they now?

If you an alumnus or former associate of TraCCC, we would be happy to share your professional achievements with the community. Please send us a short update to traccc@gmu.edu if you would like to be included in an upcoming newsletter.

Rovshan Ibrahimov is currently the Head of the Foreign Policy Analysis Department of the SAM Center for Strategic Studies (Azerbaijan) and the Head of the International Relations Department of Qafqaz University. He edited and contributed a chapter to the English language publication "Energy and Azerbaijan: History, Strategy and Cooperation" published in 2013 in Baku.

Hyungsok Kwak (TraCCC 2005-2007) was promoted to the position of Director General for Corruption Reports of the Anti-corruption and Civil Rights Commission for the Republic of Korea. Dr. Kwak received his doctorate from Sunkunkwon University in 2012 with a dissertation entitled "A Study on the Possibility of Public Officials' Unethical Behavior in a Conflict of Interest Situation – Applying the Theory of Planned Behavior."

Alexandra Seltzer (TraCCC 2011-2012) wrote a paper entitled "Human Trafficking: The Case of Burmese Refugees in Thailand," which was published in the International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice. The paper was originally written for Dr. Shelley's course on human trafficking.

Rebecca Smokowicz (TraCCC 2010-2011) recently published a chapter in the Law Enforcement Executive Forum (2012-12(1)) entitled "The Child Labor Situation: An Analysis Focusing on Iasi and Vaslui, Romania." Her field research for the chapter was done during a World Vision Scholarship under TraCCC auspices.

[\[Back to page 1\]](#)

TraCCC IN THE NEWS

Recent appearances of TraCCC staff and researchers in print and video publications, March-May 2013

3 May, 2013: TraCCC doctoral **student Nazia Hussain** has been awarded a fellowship to attend the [TSAS Summer Academy 2013](#), the summer school of the Canadian network for research on Terrorism, Security and Society. This week-long program for graduate, post-doctoral students and junior policy makers in government, will be held at the [Liu Institute for Global Issues](#), on the Vancouver Campus of the University of British Columbia.

2 May, 2013: **Nazia Hussain's** post *Pakistan's Jihadi Problem and the Middle East* was published as part of the Middle East-Asia Project (MAP), and initiative undertaken by the [Middle East Institute](#).

16 April, 2013: **Dr. Louise Shelley's** participation in Grinnell College's three-day program on human trafficking was [covered by KCRG news](#).

5 April, 2013: Firstpost published [an article on Gretchen Peters' research on Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar](#), who "has emerged as the principal provider of financial services to narcotics traffickers and jihadists across South Asia". Peters describes Ibrahim as "the Goldman Sachs of organised crime", moving "billions of dollars annually", and

servicing "a wide range of clients from corrupt officials, to drug traffickers to terrorists."

25 March, 2013: **Dr. Louise Shelley** was interviewed for KFUCO radio's *BookTalk* about her book [Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective](#). She discussed with host Rodney Zwonitzer the scale and character of the global human trafficking problem, as well as its impact in the U.S. A recording of the full interview can be streamed or downloaded [here](#).

21 March, 2013: **Dr. Louise Shelley** received the G. O. W. Mueller Award for Outstanding Contributions to International Criminal Justice by the [Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences](#). The Mueller Award is conferred annually on an individual who has made an outstanding contribution to the field of comparative/international criminal justice spanning the areas of scholarship, leadership, and service. Dr. Shelley accepted the award at the [ACJS 2013 Annual Meeting](#) in Dallas, TX.

[\[Back to page 1\]](#)

TraCCC CALENDAR

See our [website](#) for details on upcoming events

Friday, 14 June

Film Showing: *Do I Have a Choice? A Saga of Socially Sanctioned Sexual Servitude*

Dr. Vereendra Mishra will present a showing of his short documentary film about the 'Bedia' community in India, where prostitution is an accepted practice in the midst of conservative Indian society. Following the film, Dr. Mishra will take questions and lead a discussion.

Time: 12:00-1:00 PM

See TraCCC's [Upcoming Events](#) page for details

[\[Back to page 1\]](#)

Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, 2013

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